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Introduction

On October 1, 2010, news broke of a study in which U.S. doctors
intentionally infected Guatemalans with gonorrhea, cancroid, and syphilis
to study new methods of prevention.1 For the past sixty years, the events of
the study were buried in files and forgotten.2 By chance, Professor Susan
Reverby of Wellesley College discovered the unpublished notes and
presented the first discussion of the study in her article, “Normal Exposure”
and Inoculation Syphilis: A PHS “Tuskegee” Doctor in Guatemala, 1946–
48.3
As is now known, from 1946–48, the Venereal Disease Research
Laboratory of the U.S. Public Health Service (PHS), the Pan American
Sanitary Bureau (PASB), and the Guatemalan government spearheaded a
study4 that intentionally infected and tested Guatemalan prisoners, asylum
inmates, soldiers, and orphaned children.5 The research team, led by Dr.
John C. Cutler, exposed Guatemalans to syphilis “through the use of
infectious prostitutes or directly through [an] inoculum made from tissue of
human and animal syphilitic gummas and chancres,”6 and then treated the

1. U.S. DEP’T. OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., FACT SHEET ON THE 1946-1948 U.S.
PUBLIC HEALTH SERVICE SEXUALLY TRANSMITTED DISEASES (STD) INOCULATION STUDY 1
(2010) [hereinafter FACT SHEET], available at http://www.hhs.gov/1946inoculationstudy/
1946_std_inoculations_factsheet-eng.pdf (stating the purpose of the study was “to look for
new ways to prevent STDs, including gonorrhea, cancroid, and syphilis”).
2. See Susan M. Reverby, “Normal Exposure” and Inoculation Syphilis: A PHS
“Tuskegee” Doctor in Guatemala, 1946–48, 23 J. POL’Y HIST. 6, 20 (“The extraordinary
efforts [Dr. Cutler] had made to produce disease and understand various kinds of
prophylaxis were buried in the files.”).
3. See The CNN Wire Staff, U.S. Apologizes for Infecting Guatemalans with STDs in
the 1940s, CNN, Oct. 1, 2010, http://www.cnn.com/2010/WORLD/americas/
10/01/us.guatemala.apology/index.html (last visited Apr. 2, 2012) (reporting the origins of
the Guatemala study and the revelation of the study due to Professor Reverby’s efforts) (on
file with the Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice).
4. See CTR. FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION, Report on Findings from the
U.S. Public Health Service Sexually Transmitted Disease Inoculation Study of 1946–1948,
Based on Review of Archived Papers of John Cutler, MD, at the University of Pittsburgh 4
(2010),
http://www.hhs.gov/1946inoculationstudy/cdc_rept-std_inoc_study.html (last
visited Apr. 2, 2012) (stating the parties involved in the research study) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice).
5. See Reverby, supra note 2, at 12 (stating the researchers chose, as subjects, “the
usual quartet of the available and contained: prisoners in a national penitentiary, inmates in
Guatemala’s only mental hospital, children in the national orphanage, and soldiers in a
barracks in the capital”).
6. Id. at 9.
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Guatemalans with penicillin.7 Although the researchers acknowledged they
could not use such methods in the United States,8 they experimented in
secrecy and did not seek consent from human subjects.9
Shortly following news of the Guatemala study, the Centers for
Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) responded: “Such abuses could not
occur today in research funded or conducted by the U.S. government. A
series of safeguards established over the past [forty] years provide
protection for human participants, whether in the United States or overseas,
in medical research from these types of abuses.”10 In January, 2011,
President Obama asked the Presidential Commission for the Study of
Bioethical Issues (PCSBI) to reexamine the current state of domestic and
international ethics to ensure nothing similar to the Guatemala study
happens again.11 Not only is the PCSBI conducting a thorough examination
of whether existing standards and practices are adequate for international
clinical trials, but it is also conducting a retrospective examination of the
Guatemala study and its context.12 As a result, the United States’ current
protections for human subjects are unlikely to continue as the PCSBI
focuses on improving such protections and creating a global standard.

7. See id. (“After learning what they could from each exposure that caused actual
infection (and not all did), they used penicillin, expecting, if not always, curing the
infections.”) (citations omitted).
8. See id. at 18–19 (stating that “[e]veryone involved with these studies seemed to
know they were treading on complicated ethical grounds” and that some of those involved
acknowledged such experiments could not be done in the United States).
9. See id. at 19 (discussing the lack of informed consent given by the research
subjects and how the researchers suppressed information due to concern “about the
possibility of having anything said about [the] program that would adversely affect its
continuation”) (quotations omitted).
10. FACT SHEET, supra note 1, at 1.
11. See Memorandum on Review of Human Subjects Protection, 2010 DAILY COMP.
PRES. DOC. 1015 (Nov. 24, 2010), http://origin.www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/DCPD201001015/pdf/DCPD-201001015.pdf (asking the Commission “to convene a panel to
conduct, beginning in January 2011, a thorough review of human subjects protection to
determine if federal regulations and international standards adequately guard the health and
well-being of participants in scientific studies supported by the Federal Government”).
12. See Amy Gutmann, Commissioner Chair of the Presidential Commission for the
Study of Bioethical Issues, Opening Remarks and Executive Director's Report, THE
PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION FOR THE STUDY OF BIOETHICAL ISSUES (Mar. 1, 2011),
http://www.tvworldwide.com/events/bioethics/110228/default.cfm?id=13284&type=flv&
test=0&live=0 (last visited Apr. 2, 2012) (discussing the adequacy of standards and practices
for international clinical trials) (on file with the Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights
and Social Justice).
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Through the PCSBI, the ethics of using human subjects has come to
the foreground of the U.S. government’s attention. Even in recent history,
safeguards codified in U.S. federal regulations and found in other
international sources have been both inadequate and not rigorously
enforced.13 In response to both contemporary experiments involving
human subjects and the interest of the PCSBI in improving human
protection standards, this Note addresses whether modern legal standards
adequately compel researchers to obtain informed consent and contrasts the
Guatemala study with modern human subject studies. In Part I, the details
of the Guatemala study, the ethical and legal standards of the time, and the
medical researchers’ compliance with those standards are examined. Part II
analyzes modern informed consent, draws parallels between the Guatemala
study and modern research methods, and discusses flaws in modern
informed consent standards and practices. Finally, Part III advocates for
improving U.S. protections by enacting the Research Participants Protection
Modernization Act of 2011.
I. The Guatemala Study
The U.S. government responded to news of the Guatemala study with
a statement expressing regret, outrage, and a commitment to high ethical
standards.14 Nevertheless, the U.S. public expressed fear that the study
could reignite minorities’ suspicion of medical research,15 concerns that
13. See infra Part II.D (discussing modern informed consent, lack of compliance, and
private pharmaceutical companies’ continued exploitation of human subjects despite FDA
regulations and international guidelines); see also John Daniels, U.S. Funded AIDS Research
in Haiti: Does Geography Dictate How Closely the United States Government Scrutinizes
Human Research Testing?, 11 Alb. L.J. Sci. & Tech. 203, 203 (2000) (discussing that U.S.
regulated research studies often are not reviewed adequately enough to ensure researchers
are complying with ethical standards, such as informed consent).
14. See Hillary Rodham Clinton, U.S. Sec’y of State, and Kathleen Sebelius, U.S.
Sec’y of Health and Human Services, Joint Statement by Secretaries Clinton and Sebelius on
a 1948–1948 Study (Oct. 1, 2010), available at http://www.state.gov/
secretary/rm/2010/10/148464.htm (last visited Apr. 2, 2012) (apologizing for the Guatemala
study and expressing regret) (on file with the Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights
and Social Justice); see also the White House, Office of the Press Secretary, Read-out of the
President’s Call with Guatemalan President Colom (Oct. 1, 2010), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2010/10/01/read-out-presidents-call-withguatemalan-president-colom (last visited Apr. 2, 2012) (summarizing the private telephone
conversation between President Obama and President Colom in which President Obama
communicated regret) (on file with the Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and
Social Justice).
15. See Arthur Caplan, Horrific Medical Tests of Past Raise Concerns for Today: As
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using human subjects in prisons or poor communities warrants caution,16
and worries that the United States still engages in egregious research with
human participants.17 These misgivings demonstrate that the Guatemala
study provides a helpful reference point against which to compare current
studies and ethics.
A. Inception
The Guatemala study was established to test the effectiveness of
treating syphilis with penicillin and to discover the mechanism that
transmitted syphilis.18 Gonorrhea and cancroid studies also occurred.19 The
United States received the brunt of public attention,20 but it did not control

More Research Moves Outside U.S., Are We Still Exploiting the Poor?, MSN TODAY
HEALTH, Oct. 1, 2010, http://today.msnbc.msn.com/id/39463624/ns/today-today_health (last
visited Apr. 2, 2012) (stating that “[t]rust in medical research remains tenuous because of
what was done to great-grandparents and friends” of participants in the Tuskegee study) (on
file with the Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice).
16. See Amy Goodman, From Tuskegee to Guatemala, via Nuremburg, THE CAPITAL
TIMES, Oct. 7, 2010, http://host.madison.com/ct/news/opinion/column/article_9d6531a7db5d-5854-a858-4ddfcea25a16.html (last visited Apr. 2, 2012) (stating that “efforts are
being made to loosen restrictions” that protect subjects from abusive practices such as those
in the Guatemala study, so “[w]e need to ask what ‘informed consent’ means inside a prison,
or in a poor community when money is used as an incentive to ‘volunteer’”) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice).
17. See Richard S. Saver, Medical Research Regulation After More Than Twenty-Five
Years: Old Problems, New Challenges, and Regulatory Imbalance, 19 ANN. HEALTH L. 223,
227 (2010) (“Opinion polls suggest the public’s confidence in the research [oversight]
system has been eroding, a trend, no doubt fueled by intense media coverage of subject
deaths at leading academic medical centers, regardless of how anomalous such episodes may
be.”); see also Stephen Soldz, Guatemalan Research Horrors and U.S. Hipocracy: CIA
Unethical Research Ignored, ZNET, Oct. 4, 2010, http://www.zcommunications.org/
guatemalan-research-horrors-and-us-hypocrisy-by-stephen-soldz (last visited Apr. 2, 2012)
(“According to top US officials, abusing people in the name of research without their
permission is awful, truly awful . . . . However, US officials have so far been totally silent
about horrific, unethical research conducted by US government researchers [as part of the
CIA] within the last decade.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights
and Social Justice).
18. See CTR. FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION, supra note 4 at 4 (stating that
“the primary purpose of the studies was to develop human models of transmission of
Treponema pallidum—the bacteria that causes syphilis—by sexual transmission and . . .
inoculation”).
19. See id. at 2–3 (describing that in addition to syphilis the researchers also studied
gonorrhea and chancroid).
20. See supra notes 15–17 and accompanying text (discussing the American public’s
reaction to news of the Guatemala study).
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the research directly.21 Responsibility was channeled through the Pan
American Sanitary Bureau (PASB).22 The PASB enlisted the aid of
Guatemala and the United States and officially sponsored the Guatemala
study as part of its commitment to “maintaining and improving the health of
all the people of the [twenty-one] American publics and also to preventing
the occurrence and spread of transmissible diseases in international
commerce.”23 However, even though it was a separate entity from the
PASB, the U.S. Public Health Service (PHS) exerted substantial control of
the study behind the scenes.24
Conveniently for the United States and the PASB, an ideal testing site
was created by the interest of a leader in Guatemala’s health industry,
influence from the United States, and Guatemala’s demographics. The
selection of Guatemala for the research site was based largely on the
suggestion of Dr. Juan Funes, chief of the Venereal Disease Control
Division of the Guatemalan Sanidad Publica.25 Like other Latin American
countries that enlisted the aid of the PHS,26 Guatemala was seeking to build
a health infrastructure, and Dr. Funes’ familiarity with the PHS facilitated
the relationship.27 The United States wielded enormous economic28 and
political29 pressure during this time, which likely encouraged the
21. See CTR. FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION, supra note 4, at 1 (explaining
that the PHS and the PASB “collaborated with several government agencies in Guatemala
on U.S. National Institutes of Health-funded studies involving deliberate exposure of human
subjects with bacteria that cause sexually transmitted diseases”).
22. See id. at 5 (stating that the PASB received a grant from the United States to
conduct the Guatemala study with the aid of U.S. personnel and Guatemalan cooperation).
23. Bolivar J. Lloyd, The Pan American Sanitary Bureau, 20 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH &
NATION’S
HEALTH
925
(1930),
available
at
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/
pmc/articles/PMC1556056/pdf/amjphnation00625-0021.pdf.
24. See Reverby, supra note 2, at 11 (stating that “one historian has argued the Pan
American Sanitary Bureau ‘functioned until the late 1930s…as a virtual branch of the
THE ROCKEFELLER
[PHS]’”) (citing MARCOS CUETO, MISSIONARIES OF SCIENCE:
FOUNDATION AND LATIN AMERICA xiii (Bloomington 1994)).
25. See CTR. FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION, supra note 4, at 5 (stating that
Dr. Funes proposed that the United States should conduct the research in Guatemala).
26. See Reverby, supra note 2, at 11 (discussing the PHS’s involvement in developing
public health infrastructure in Latin America).
27. See Reverby, supra note 2, at 9 (“The PHS training of Dr. Juan Funes,
Guatemala’s leading venereal disease public health official, made the forging of close
cooperation easier and the building of a public health infrastructure important.”).
28. See id. (“The United Fruit Company [, a U.S. company,] owned and controlled
much of Guatemala, the quintessential ‘banana republic,’ in the first half of the twentieth
century.”).
29. See id. (“Between 1944 and the U.S.-led CIA coup of the elected government in
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Guatemalan government’s collaboration. Moreover, Guatemala was an
attractive site because syphilis was not yet prevalent among Guatemalans,
supplying a fresh demographic of subjects.30 Contraction of the diseases
could be authentic also because Guatemalan law permitted prostitutes to
visit male prisoners.31
Given the benefits of testing in Guatemala, the PASB received funding
from the PHS.32 When the PASB allocated responsibilities, it decided the
U.S. Venereal Disease Research Laboratory would head the research and
provide medical personnel while the Guatemalan government would
facilitate training and afford cooperation with government entities.33
Although deception and secrecy later characterized this study,34 the
scientific community initially regarded the study favorably, and even the
U.S. Surgeon General was “keenly interested.”35
B. Testing Procedures
Respected scientists had high expectations for the Guatemala study
because the U.S. researchers examined “syphilization” (human response to
fresh infection) and methods of prevention after sexual exposure.36 Though
animal experimentation had provided insight, the researchers wanted to
study syphilization via “normal exposure.”37 Normal exposure entailed
1954, efforts were made at labor protection laws, land reform, and democratic elections.”).
30. See id. at 11 (“Unlike Alabama, where the PHS expected to find a large number of
subjects with the late latent stage of the disease already, Guatemala offered subjects who did
not yet have syphilis.”).
31. See CTR. FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION, supra note 4, at 5–6 (stating that
“prostitution was legalized to the extent that prostitutes were allowed to pay regular visits to
men in penal institutions”) (citations omitted).
32. See id. (stating that “[a] research grant was made by the USPHS Division of
Research Grants,” the unit in charge of United States National Institute of Health extramural
funding, to the PASB).
33. See CTR. FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION, supra note 4, at 6 (describing
the responsibilities that the VRDL and the Guatemalan government assumed).
34. See Reverby, supra note 2, at 16 (stating that “[d]eception was central” to the
Guatemala study).
35. See CTR. FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION, supra note 4, at 6 (listing
several eminent scientific researchers interested in the study before the study commenced).
36. See id. at 12 (“Cutler and Funes had two goals. One was to use what was called
‘syphilization’ to test the human response to ‘fresh infective material to enhance body
response to disease . . . [to understand] superinfection and reinfection.’ The second goal
was to find ways to prevent the disease immediately after exposure.”) (citations omitted).
37. See id. (“Animal experimentation, especially with rabbits, was long a mainstay in
twentieth-century syphilis research, but it could not answer these pressing research
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male prisoners receiving visits by prostitutes who were infected, either
naturally or artificially.38 The researchers encountered a problem, however.
Even if promised medication, the inmates resisted testing because they
believed the frequent samples left them weakened.39 What is more, the
research did not progress as planned because either many men did not
contract syphilis40 or tested positive before normal exposure.41
Consequently, the group of uninfected subjects grew too small to provide
an adequate sample, and the researchers had to abandon testing prisoners.42
After fruitless results with prison inmates and inconclusive blood tests
on naturally infected children,43 the researchers turned to patients in the
National Mental Health Hospital to determine whether penicillin could be a
prophylaxis, not just a cure.44 Though consent was given, it came from the
hospital, not individual patients.45 The hospital bartered consent for items
such as anticonvulsant drugs and cutlery,46 and qualifying patients47 were
questions. The PHS researchers wanted to do a study where they knew there would be a
good deal of what they politely called ‘normal exposure’ to the disease in humans.”).
38. See id. (stating that men were infected by “prostitutes who tested positive for
either syphilis or gonorrhea” or by “uninfected prostitutes [who] had inoculums of the
diseases placed on their cervixes”). Interestingly, regardless of which prostitute was
employed, U.S. taxpayers paid the prostitutes via the PHS grant. Id.
39. See Reverby, supra note 2, at 13 (“‘[T]he inmates were for the most part
uneducated and superstitious. Most of them believed they were being weakened’ by the
frequent blood withdrawals. Even though penicillin and iron pills were promised, ‘in their
minds there was no connection between the loss of a large tube of blood and possible
benefits of a small pill.’”).
40. See id. (“Not enough of the sexually well-serviced men . . . even when plied with
alcohol, seemed to be getting syphilis.”) (citations omitted).
41. See id. (“The next problem the researchers ran into regarded the blood tests: too
many positives even before more ‘normal exposure’ occurred.”).
42. See id. (“Since [the researchers] needed men who either had never had the disease
or had already been cured of the disease for their studies, they discovered their pool was too
small for statistical significance to be possible.”).
43. See Reverby, supra note 2, at 13. Due to the difficulties encountered in prisons, the
researchers studied the effectiveness of the blood tests on children between the ages of six
and sixteen in the National Orphanage. Id. Notably, the researchers did not infect children
with syphilis. Id. at 13–14. However, the researchers had difficulty ascertaining why
eighty-nine children who had no clinical signs of syphilis yielded positive test results, so the
researchers abandoned testing this particular population.
44. See CTR. FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION, supra note 4, at 8–9 (discussing
the switch to studies asylum inmates rather than prisoners) (citations omitted).
45. See Reverby, supra note 2, at 14 (“As in Tuskegee and throughout the global
South in these years, the cooperation was sought with the institution, not with the subjectinmates or their families.”).
46. See id. at 14 (stating the researchers found “the best way to gain that cooperation
was by offering supplies . . . [such as] anti-convulsant drugs . . . a refrigerator for

THE GUATEMALA STD INOCULATION STUDY

433

bribed to participate with cigarettes.48 In order to expose a male patient to
the inoculum, a doctor abraded the subject’s penis and dripped “syphilitic
emulsion” onto a cotton dressing for “at least an hour, sometimes two.”49
Due to cultural beliefs about men viewing women’s bodies,50 women
received the inoculum on their forearms, faces, or mouths.51
In all the experiments, the records indicate that the human subjects
gave no consent.52 The U.S. Venereal Research Disease Laboratory
became uncomfortable with using asylum patients as subjects.53 So, when
the study became too expensive, “the project in Guatemala became difficult
to justify.”54 As a result, the United States’ direct involvement concluded
when the study was terminated in 1948. Two local physicians and the
PASB continued to observe patients as late as 1953.55 Questionable ethics
biologicals, a motion picture projector that supplied the sole recreation for the inmates, metal
cups, plates and forks to supplement the completely inadequate supply available”) (citations
omitted).
47. See CTR. FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION, supra note 4, at 10 (stating
subjects were selected “based on baseline serologic findings and a history of syphilis,
perceived cooperativity, and the likelihood that the subject would not be released” before the
study concluded).
48. See Reverby, supra note 2, at 14 (“Individual subjects were offered cigarettes: an
entire packet for inoculation, blood draws, or spinal taps, and a single cigarette for ‘clinical
observation.’”) (citations omitted).
49. Id. at 15 (“[A] doctor held the subject’s penis, pulled back the foreskin, abraded
the penis slightly just short of drawing blood by scraping the skin with a hypodermic needle,
introduced a cotton pledget (or small dressing), and dripped drops of the syphilitic emulsion
onto the pad and through it to the roughed skin on the man’s penis for at least an hour,
sometimes two.”).
50. See id. at 15 (stating that there were “local prejudices against male viewing of the
body, even by physicians” (quotations omitted)).
51. See id. (stating that “the inoculum was inserted after needles were used to abrade
the women’s forearms, face or mouth”).
52. See Reverby, supra note 2, at 21 (stating that the researchers “were morally
capable of infecting people with syphilis, for their faith in their cause allowed them to infect
people with this dreadful disease without their consent or even knowledge— at least when
those people lacked power and white skin”).
53. See id. at 19 (stating that U.S. authorities “seemed less concerned with the
prostitute transmission studies taking place in the prison, but seemed more squeamish about
the politics and morality of the inoculation studies taking place in the mental hospital”)
(citations omitted).
54. Reverby, supra note 2, at 17.
55. See CTR. FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION, supra note 4, at 22 (“Although
syphilis serologic results and follow-up clinical observations were recorded on some
subjects until 1953, there is no record of what activities occurred after patient follow-up was
taken over by PASB and the two local physicians, nor whether further human inoculation
studies were performed . . . .”).
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continued, however, because “while the majority of exposed and infected
subjects appear[ed] to have eventually been prescribed doses of penicillin,
treatment was routinely delayed for several months after exposure and a
substantial number of subjects were never treated.”56
C. Informed Consent
Though it may not be obvious from the behavior in the Guatemala
study, both the American public and the medical profession were wellaware of unethical experiments.57 Criticism was voiced in the United States
as early as 1833, when U.S. surgeon William Beaumont announced that
doctors ought to secure “free consent” from patients before procedures.58
In fact, surgeons and hospital administrators sought written consent from
patients in the late nineteenth and twentieth centuries.59
Despite early advocacy for patient rights, attitudes shifted with the
onset of World Wars I and II when scientific research became “one
essential key to our security as a nation, to our better health, to more jobs,
to high standard of living, and to our cultural progress.”60 The medical
profession itself did not advocate for patient rights but successfully
“undertook great efforts . . . to block legal initiatives aimed at the restriction
of experiments on humans.”61 The U.S. government intervened only when
56.
57.

Id. at 21.
See WOLFGANG WEYERS, THE ABUSE OF MAN: AN ILLUSTRATED HISTORY OF
DUBIOUS MEDICAL EXPERIMENTATION 174 (Ardor Scribendi, Ltd. 2003) (“[P]rofound respect
for the rights of individuals inherent in the Constitution of the United States of America
[initially] lowered the threshold for tolerance for unconscionable treatment of patients.”).
58. See id. (“Nowhere, however, was criticism of human experimentation as
vociferous as in the United States . . . As early as 1833, an American surgeon, William
Beaumont, called for the procurement of 'free consent’ of patients prior to having any
medical experiment performed on them.”) (citing THE NAZI DOCTORS AND THE NUREMBERG
CODE: HUMAN RIGHTS IN HUMAN EXPERIMENTATION 121–44 (George J. Annas & Michael
A. Grodin eds., New York, Oxford University Press 1992)).
59. See id. at 178 (“In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the growing
number of lawsuits concerning unauthorized surgical procedures prompted surgeons and
hospital administrators to introduce forms for written consent.”).
60. Id. (citing FADEN RR ET AL., FINAL REPORT OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON
HUMAN RADIATION EXPERIMENTS 10 (1995)).
61. WEYERS, supra note 57, at 214; see also U.S. DEP’T. OF HEALTH AND HUMAN
SERVS., INFORMATION ON PROTECTION OF HUMAN SUBJECTS IN RESEARCH FUNDED OR
REGULATED BY U.S. GOVERNMENT: HOW TODAY’S RULES PROHIBIT ETHICAL ABUSES IN
HUMAN SUBJECTS RESEARCH 1 (2010) [hereinafter INFORMATION ON PROTECTION], available
at
http://www.hhs.gov/1946inoculationstudy/information_on_protection_of_human_sub
jects_in_research.pdf (“There was tremendous growth in research around World War II.
Human subjects research entered what some scholars have described as an ‘unashamedly
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it sensed “serious adverse reactions from the public”62 and greatly enlarged
its spending on medical research during this period.63 As a result, when the
Guatemala study occurred in the late 1940s, the U.S. government both
broadly funded and routinely ignored active human experimentation.
In light of the flexible approach to ethics adopted by medical
researchers and the financial endorsement by the U.S. government, one
could speculate that the researchers knew their actions could be deemed
morally unethical, but they were unsure of legal standards.64 According to
the Department of Health and Human Services, no specific codes, laws, or
regulations governed the ethics of human experimentation during that time
period.65 While no binding law oversaw experimentation in an international
setting, U.S. law did control research conducted in the United States.
Consequently, it was likely that the U.S. research team in Guatemala was
aware of legal and ethical standards.
1. U.S. Legislation & Ethical Codes
At the time of the Guatemala study, the United States had no
legislation that required medical researchers to obtain informed consent.66
The American public, however, had expressed interest in regulating animal
and human research.67 Between 1900 and 1924, state legislatures discussed
utilitarian phase.’”).
62. Id. (stating that consent was only sought when “researchers and administrators of
the Committee of Medical Research sensed the possibility of serious adverse reaction from
the public”).
63. See id. at 174 (“In 1945, the U.S. government spent approximately $700,000 on
medical research. Ten years later, the total had climbed to $36 million . . . .”).
64. See Reverby, supra note 2, at 19 (“Malaria specialist G. Robert Coatney, who had
done prison malaria studies, visited the project in February 1947. In reporting to Cutler after
he returned to the States, he explained that he had brought Surgeon General Thomas Parran
up to date and that with a merry twinkle [that] came into his eye . . . [he] said, 'You know,
we couldn’t do such an experiment in this country.’”) (quotations omitted) (citations
omitted).
65. See INFORMATION ON PROTECTION, supra note 61, at 1 (“Prior to World War II
there were no specific codes of ethics, laws, or regulations governing the conduct of human
subjects research.”).
66. See Jennifer J. Couture, Note, The Changes in Informed Consent in Experimental
Procedures: The Evolution of a Concept, 1 J. OF HEALTH & BIOMED. L. 125, 134 (2004)
(stating that since the turn of the century, the FDA had regulations in place to protect the
public from harmful experimental or untested treatments; however, these regulations largely
focused on protecting consumers from misbranded or adulterated food, drugs, and
cosmetics).
67. See WEYERS, supra note 57, at 195–202 (discussing legislation regulating animal
vivisection and other legislation opposing experimentation on humans supported by public
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bills that restricted experimentation on humans and animals, though none
passed successfully.68
The first federal bill regarding human
experimentation, Senate Bill 3424, was introduced by Senator Gallinger of
New Hampshire in 1900.69 The bill proposed regulating experiments in the
District of Columbia by requiring prior disclosure of research methods,
mandating written consent from human subjects,70 and prohibiting
experimentation upon vulnerable people.71 Both the medical profession and
Congress rejected the bill.72 Indeed, the president of the American Medical
Association (AMA) considered Senate Bill 3424 unnecessary because
experiments using human subjects were “rare.”73 Remarkably, human
subject research, including vivisection (experimental surgery on a living
organism), occurred across the country at this time.74
No legislation governed human subject research, and the effect of
William Beaumont’s ethics code and others proposed at this time were
“practically nil.”75 The AMA, however, had addressed the issue of ethics
groups).
68. See id. at 202 (discussing that proposed legislation in Illinois, Pennsylvania, and
other state legislatures were considering regulating human and animal experimentation)
(citations omitted).
69. See id. at 201 (“Senator Gallinger introduced a proposal for the regulation of
experiments on humans in the District of Columbia.”).
70. See id. (stating that “Senate Bill 3424 required prior disclosure of ‘the objects and
methods of the proposed experiment’ to Commissioners of the District, who could then issue
a specific license for performance of the experiment” that had to include the witnessed and
notarized written permission of test subjects) (citing S.E. LEDERER, SUBJECTED TO SCIENCE:
HUMAN EXPERIMENTATION IN AMERICA BEFORE THE SECOND WORLD WAR 143–46 (1997)).
71. See id. (stating that a subject had to be at least twenty years old and “in full and
complete possession of all his or her reasoning faculties” and experiments involving
children, “women during and for one year after pregnancy,” and “any aged, infirm, epileptic,
insane, or feeble-minded person were prohibited”) (citing S.E. LEDERER, SUBJECTED TO
SCIENCE: HUMAN EXPERIMENTATION IN AMERICA BEFORE THE SECOND WORLD WAR 143–46
(1997)).
72. See id. at 202 (“The proposed legislation was rejected out of hand, and harshly, by
the medical profession . . . [And] Gallinger’s bill was defeated [by Congress], as was a new
version of it that he introduced in 1902.”).
73. See id. (stating that the medical profession and Congress rejected the bill because
“experiments in humans were so rare that a special act of Congress was not needed to
control them”).
74. See id. at 195–210 (describing experiments such as human and animal vivisection
or exposing healthy children to diseases that inspired the public to call for regulation)
(citations omitted).
75. See WEYERS, supra note 57, at 43–44 (“[Beaumont’s proposal] and other ethical
codes for experiments on humans were proposed in the early 1830s, a time when systematic
medical experiments had just begun. The impact of those proposals, however, were
practically nil.”).
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generally.76 In 1847, nearly a hundred years before the Guatemala study,
the AMA issued The Principles of Medical Ethics77 to outline physicians’
obligations.78 Physicians were to treat patients with “attention and
humanity.”79 But, it also warned physicians “to avoid all things which have
a tendency to discourage the patient and to depress his spirits” because
physicians ought to be “a minister of hope and comfort.”80 These
conflicting messages suggest that informed consent may not have been a
priority if it interfered with medical results or good spirits.81 However,
after the Nuremberg trials, when human experimentation received more
international outrage, the AMA issued a clearer statement:82
In order to conform to the ethics of the American Medical Association,
three requirements must be satisfied: (1) the voluntary consent of the
person on whom the experiment is to be performed; (2) the danger of
each experiment must be previously investigated by animal
experimentation; and (3) the experiment must be performed under
83
proper medical protection and management.

Despite this step towards more protective guidelines, the AMA’s
principles still lacked specific provisions dealing with consent that was not
only voluntary, but also informed and protecting of vulnerable people.84 As
76. See American Medical Association House of Delegates, Minutes of New Orleans
Session: Principles of Medical Ethics, 1903 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 1379, 1379 (stating the
ethical principles physicians owed).
77. See American Medical Association, History of AMA Ethics: Ethics Timeline:
1847 to 1940, http://www.ama-assn.org/ama/pub/physician-resources/medical-ethics/codemedical-ethics/history-ama-ethics/ethics-timeline-1847-1940.page (last visited Apr. 2, 2012)
(stating that in 1847 the “AMA Code of Medical Ethics [was] written and published”) (on
file with the Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice).
78. See American Medical Association House of Delegates, supra note 76, at 1379
(stating that physicians have duties towards their patients, to each other and the profession at
large, and the public, and each obligation has an article enumerating the duties).
79. See id. at 1379–80 (stating the ethical code to which the AMA recommended
medical officials adhere).
80. Id. at 1379.
81. See Douglas Andrew Grimm, Informed Consent for All! No Exceptions, 37 N.M.L.
REV. 39, 39 (2007) (stating that physicians were cautioned not to disclose all medical truths
to patients and “the American Medical Association's first code of ethics warned the
physician ‘to avoid all things which have a tendency to discourage the patient and to depress
his spirits’”).
82. See WEYERS, supra note 57, at 351–52 (stating that the AMA was induced “to
issue guidelines for experiments on human beings” at the same time as the Nuremberg Code
was drafted).
83. Id. at 631 (emphasis added).
84. See id. at 352 (“Compared with earlier regulations . . . the AMA principles were
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a result, even ethics codes that self-regulated the medical profession did not
truly protect human subjects.
2. U.S. Case Law
Though statutory law was scarce and ethics codes were ineffective, a
small body of case law emerged in the years before the Guatemala study.85
In 1914, while sitting on the New York Court of Appeals, Justice Benjamin
Cardozo decided Schloendorff v. Society of N.Y. Hospital.86 The decision
has “probably [had] the most impact on the doctrine of informed consent.”87
In Schloendorff, a woman consented to exploratory surgery and explicitly
withheld consent to surgical removals; the surgeon removed a tumor
anyway.88 Justice Cardozo found that even though the surgery benefited
the patient, “[e]very human being of adult years and sound mind has a right
to determine what shall be done with his own body; and a surgeon who
performs an operation without his patient’s consent, commits an assault, for
which he is liable in damages.”89 Consequently, Schloendorff established
that a patient has the right to actively participate in making medical
choices.90 After Schloendorff, the patient’s right to give or withhold
consent to medical procedures (particularly surgical operations) was
celebrated, and courts throughout the United States followed Cardozo’s
principles.91
somewhat primitive, lacking provisions for informed consent and the protection of
particularly vulnerable populations.”).
85. See Peter M. Murray, History of Informed Consent, 10 IOWA ORTHOPAEDIC J. 104,
105 (1990) (describing the history of American case law that has shaped modern informed
consent).
86. Schloendorff v. Soc’y of N.Y. Hosp., 211 N.Y. 125, 129–30 (1914), overruled by
Bing v. Thunig, 2 N.Y.2d 656 (1957) (determining that “[e]very human being of adult years
and sound mind has a right to determine what shall be done with his own body; and a
surgeon who performs an operation without his patient’s consent, commits an assault, for
which he is liable in damages”).
87. Murray, supra note 85, at 105.
88. See WEYERS, supra note 57, at 178 (“[A] woman consented to an exploratory
abdominal operation but insisted that no surgical removal be performed. After her surgeon
removed a fibroid tumor discovered during the course of the operation, she brought suit
against the hospital.”).
89. Schloendorff, 211 N.Y. at 129–30.
90. See id. at 130 (stating that the principle that a patient has a right to give consent “is
true except in cases of emergency where the patient is unconscious and where it is necessary
to operate before consent can be obtained”).
91. See, e.g., Birnbaum v. Siegler, 76 N.Y.S.2d 173, 174 (N.Y. App. Div. 1948)
(“Performance of an operation without valid consent previously obtained constitutes an

THE GUATEMALA STD INOCULATION STUDY

439

After Schloendorff, a patient may have had the right to consent to
surgical procedures, but the standards were still very different for
individuals in mental institutions. Medical researchers often used these
populations, who were unable to give legal consent, because researchers
knew that abuse of “those who lacked advocacy . . . would likely go
unnoticed.”92 Affirming this attitude, the Supreme Court decided Buck v.
Bell.93 The Court famously upheld a Virginia law that permitted sexual
sterilization of intellectually disabled persons without the person’s
consent.94 Instead of supporting individual patient consent, the Supreme
Court endorsed the principle that the State’s consent (via a mental
institution superintendent) was sufficient.95
Although the Supreme Court established in Buck v. Bell that consent to
medical procedures need not be sought from asylum patients,96 the Court
implicitly abandoned this doctrine sixteen years later. In Skinner v.
Oklahoma,97 the Court invalidated a statute that forced sterilization of
assault on the patient, for which the surgeon would be liable.”) (citing Schloendorff v. Soc’y
of N.Y. Hosp., 211 N.Y. 125, 130 (1914), overruled by Bing v. Thunig, 2 N.Y.2d 656
(1957)); see also Bonner v. Moran, 126 F.2d 121, 122 (D.C. Cir. 1941) (adopting the rule
that “surgical operation is a technical battery, regardless of its results, and is excusable only
when there is express or implied consent by the patient; or, stated somewhat differently, the
surgeon is liable in damages if the operation is unauthorized”) (citing Schloendorff, 211 N.Y.
at 130); see also Donald v. Swann, 137 So. 178, 180 (Ala. Ct. App. 1931) (adopting the
“general rule . . . supported by unquestioned authority” that “every human being of adult
years and sound mind has a right to determine what shall be done with his own body” so any
operation performed without consent and over the patient’s protests is an assault and battery)
(citing Schloendorff, 211 N.Y. at 130).
92. See WEYERS, supra note 57, at 174 (“[T]he evidence of intolerance of Americans
in regard to experiments on humans led scientists to utilize the most vulnerable populations
[such as prisoners, orphans, and mental patients].”).
93. Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 207 (1927) (finding that “[i]t is better for all the world,
if instead of waiting to execute degenerate offspring for crime, or to let them starve for their
imbecility, society can prevent those who are manifestly unfit from continuing their kind”
and “the principle that sustains compulsory vaccination is broad enough to cover cutting the
Fallopian tubes”) (citing Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905)).
94. See id. at 205–07 (finding that a Virginia law that allowed sterilization for the
health of the patient and the betterment of society was constitutionally sound).
95. See id. at 205 (stating that the statute permitted a superintendent, who is “of
opinion that it is for the best interests of the patients and of society that an inmate under his
care should be sexually sterilized . . . may have the operation performed upon any patient
afflicted with hereditary forms of insanity, imbecility, [etc.]”).
96. See supra notes 93–98 and accompanying text (explaining that the Supreme Court
upheld a law that allowed superintendents of mental institutions to substitute their consent
for that of the patients).
97. Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 538 (1942) (finding that an Oklahoma statute
that permitted sexual sterilization of recidivist criminals who committed crimes of moral
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recurring criminals.98 The Court found that the statute contravened the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment99 because sexual
sterilization caused “irreparable injury.”100 Although the Court did not
directly address a prisoner’s right to grant or withhold consent, the
emphasis the Court placed on the irreversibility of the injury diminishes the
notion that the State’s consent may be substituted for a patient’s consent.101
Hence, Schloendorff suggested that doctors must seek consent from their
patients or face liability, but whether the government may consent instead
of an asylum patient or criminal remained less clear.102
3. Guatemalan & International Standards
While the United States had limited legal authority pertaining to
human subject research, Guatemala and international law had fewer
sources. Due to the influence by the military and U.S. economic power,
Guatemala was known for its “relative freedoms” immediately post-World
War II.103
Until 1944, just before the Guatemala study, General Ubico
administered law without challenge and governed Guatemala with military
rule104 (militarization of Guatemalan society was interrupted from 1944–54
turpitude ran afoul of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment).
98. See id. at 536–37 (stating that a “habitual criminal” was “a person who, having
been convicted two or more times for crimes ‘amounting to felonies involving moral
turpitude’” and “[m]achinery is provided for the institution by the Attorney General of a
proceeding against such a person in the Oklahoma courts for a judgment that such person
shall be rendered sexually sterile”).
99. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (“No state shall . . . deny to any person within
its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”).
100. See Skinner, 316 U.S. at 541 (“[The statute] runs afoul of the equal protection
clause, though we give Oklahoma that large deference which the rule of the foregoing cases
requires . . . marriage and procreation are fundamental to the very existence and survival of
the race . . . any experiment which the State conducts is to his irreparable injury.”).
101. See id. (“Any experiment which the State conducts is to his irreparable injury. He
is forever deprived of a basic liberty.”).
102. See supra notes 86–94 and accompanying text (discussing Schloendorff and the
essentialness of informed consent to experimental medical procedures).
103. Reverby, supra note 2, at 11 (“When the PHS looked to Guatemala for its research
in the immediate post-World War II years, it came into the country during the period known
for its relative freedoms.”).
104. See HILDE HEY, GROSS HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS: A SEARCH FOR CAUSES: A
STUDY OF GUATEMALA AND COSTA RICA 28 (The Hague 1995) (“General Ubico ruled
Guatemala for fourteen years, between 1931 and 1944; he advanced military rule without
being challenged.”).
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due to a coup led by the CIA).105 General Ubico also advanced the interests
of the United Fruit Company,106 a U.S. entity that “owned and controlled
much of Guatemala” at that time.107 As a result, the Guatemalan military
continued to rigidly secure internal law and order during the Guatemalan
study,108 but the U.S. economic influence also likely incentivized
cooperation.109 Moreover, with the cooperation of Guatemala’s Ministry of
Health, the National Army of the Revolution, the National Mental Health
Hospital, and the Ministry of Justice, no real regulation was imposed on the
study.110 Instead, the Guatemalan government demanded medical services
as the price of cooperation.111
Bolstered by Guatemala’s endorsement, the Pan American Sanitary
Bureau orchestrated the Guatemala study.112 The PASB enacted The Pan
American Sanitary Bureau Code in 1924,113 onto which Guatemala signed
in 1924 and the U.S. Senate ratified in 1925.114 The purpose of the code
105. See Reverby, supra note 2, at 11 (stating that the CIA led a coup of the elected
government in 1954).
106. See HEY, supra note 104, at 28 (stating that General “Ubico enhanced the interests
of foreign companies, particularly the United Fruit Company”).
107. Reverby, supra note 2, at 11.
108. See HEY, supra note 104, at 28 (discussing the militarization of Guatemalan
government).
109. See United Fruit Historical Society, Chronology, http://www.unitedfruit.
org/chron.htm (last visited Apr. 2, 2012) (describing the United Fruit Company’s history, its
extensive influence, and the freedoms the Guatemalan government allowed the company)
(on file with the Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice).
110. See Reverby, supra note 2, at 9 (“[T]he PHS cooperated with officials at the
Guatemala’s Ministry of Health, the National Army of the Revolution, the National Mental
Health Hospital and Ministry of Justice on what was benignly called ‘a series of
experimental studies on syphilis in man.’”).
111. See id. at 17 (“[The Guatemalan officials] asked Cutler to test and treat men in
army barracks, to do surveys of disease in the lowlands, and to provide more penicillin for
the country as part of the price for cooperation. He traded off drugs for malaria at the
orphanage for the right to continue blood testing.”).
112. See CTR. FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION, supra note 4, at 5 (stating that
the PASB received a grant from the United States to conduct the Guatemala study with the
aid of U.S. personnel and Guatemalan cooperation).
113. See Seventh Pan American Sanitary Conference, The Pan American Sanitary
Code: International Sanitary Convention Signed at Habana, Cuba, November 14, 1924, 40
PUB. HEALTH REP. 483, 484–85 (1925), available at http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/
pmc/articles/PMC1975980/pdf/pubhealthreporig02451-0001.pdf
(stating
that
“[t]he
Presidents of Argentine, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Dominican Republic,
Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Mexico, Salvador, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, United States of
America, Uruguay, and Venezuela” entered into a sanitary convention to promote and
protect the health of their nations).
114. See id. at 483 (“In executive session on February 23, 1925, the Senate of the
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was to “better promot[e] and protect[] the public health.”115 The code
focused on preventing the spread of infectious diseases by mandating each
country to report outbreaks of diseases and take precautionary measures at
borders, ports, or airports.116 Significantly, despite extensive regulation of
travel, the code mentions no premium on the value of human life or dignity,
an attitude shared by the Guatemala study’s research team.117
In addition to oversight imposed by the PASB, the World Health
Organization (WHO), a specialized agency of the United Nations, ratified a
constitution in 1946 onto which both the United States and Guatemala
signed.118 Guatemala and the United States dedicated themselves to the
objective of “attainment by all peoples of the highest possible level of
health”119 and “developing an informed public opinion among all peoples
on matters of health.”120 However, the WHO did not have its First World
Health Assembly until 1948.121 Prior to the Assembly, the Interim
Commission endeavored to take over the fight against venereal diseases and
to integrate regional health organizations such as the PASB.122 As a result,
the WHO did not have much influence during the time of the Guatemala
study, and the PASB’s goals, with its minimal concern for individuals,
remained the dominant attitude.123

United States ratified the international sanitary convention of the American
Republics . . . .”).
115. Id. at 484.
116. See id. at 489–97 (discussing the sanitary codes and documentation needed for
people traveling and transporting goods between countries).
117. See generally id. at 483–98.
118. See Constitution of the World Health Organization (New York, July 22, 1946) 14
U.N.T.S. 185, entered into force Apr. 7, 1948, available at http://whqlibdoc.
who.int/hist/official_records/constitution.pdf (showing the signatures of the delegates of
Guatemala and the United States).
119. Id. at Chapter I: Objective, Art. 1.
120. Id. at Chapter II: Functions, Art. 2(r).
121. See YVES BEIGBEDER, THE WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION, 12–13 (Martinus
Nijhoff Publishers 1998) (stating that the First World Health Assembly met in June 1948
when it adopted most of the policies of the Interim Commission).
122. See id. at 12 (stating that objectives of the Interim Commission were to take over
“the activities of former health organizations,” which included fighting against venereal
diseases and integrating regional health organizations).
123. See supra note 36–59 and accompanying text (discussing the PASB’s lack of
concern for human life and dignity).
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4. Compliance of the Researchers
The medical researchers in Guatemala did not seek consent from the
study participants and tried to conceal their actions.124 However, given the
notoriety of human experimentation, the U.S. researchers were likely aware
of the issue.125 When one evaluates the researchers’ choices against U.S.,
Guatemalan, and international standards, a confusing picture emerges.
Both the U.S. medical profession and the American public altered their
opinions repeatedly on the matter of human experimentation during the first
half of the twentieth century—advocating against experimentation, denying
that experimentation occurred, and finally turning a blind eye.126 Early
ethical code proposals were largely ignored,127 and when one considers the
events of the Guatemala study and the legality of those actions, it is
important to note that while the AMA’s advisory statement may have
tugged at the moral heartstrings of physicians, it was not binding.128 The
medical profession favored medical progress rather than informed
consent.129 Still, the researchers in Guatemala tried to conceal their
actions130 because they realized the profession would not publicly approve
of the methods used.131
Like the medical profession, U.S. case law sent a conflicting message.
Under Schloendorff, a doctor ought to seek informed consent,132 and
124. See Reverby, supra note 2, at 16–18 (discussing the deceptions that characterized
the research).
125. See id. at 18–20 (discussing the concerns that Cutler and other U.S. researchers
had about the ethics of the study).
126. See supra notes 60–63 and accompanying text (discussing early activism against
medical experimentation without consent and the changes in attitude with the advent of
World Wars I and II).
127. See supra note 65 and accompanying text (stating that the effect of ethical codes
during this time were “practically nil”).
128. See American Medical Association House of Delegates, supra note 76, at 1379
(stating that the AMA ethical code was only “suggested and advisory”).
129. See supra notes 60–61 and accompanying text (discussing the attitude of the
medical profession post-World Wars I and II).
130. See id. (noting that the researchers tried to experiment in secrecy, and Cutler’s
supervisor warned, “I hope you will not hesitate to stop the experimental work in the event
of there being an undue amount of interest in that phase of the study”).
131. See Reverby, supra note 2, at 20 (“Cutler, too, acknowledged that other
syphilogists thought human experimentation on penicillin as a prevention for syphilis that
required inoculation with the disease ‘could not be ethically carried out.’”).
132. See supra notes 89–94 and accompanying text (discussing that Schloendorff
established the importance of informed consent in medical procedures).
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Skinner suggested that criminals may claim similar protections.133
However, because Buck v. Bell was not overruled, it remained unclear
whether asylum patients have comparable rights.134 Moreover, no U.S.
legislation or case law defined what was appropriate internationally.135 In
addition to the cacophony of U.S. messages, the Guatemalan government
prioritized providing services to its people rather than protection of
individual rights.136 International organizations did not clarify ethics either.
The United States and Guatemala had voluntarily signed onto the WHO
constitution, which valued developing an informed public opinion.137 Yet,
the United States and Guatemala supported the methods employed at the
Guatemala study; thus, the Guatemala researchers did not comply with a
guideline to which their governing country had voluntarily agreed.
The researchers did not fulfill the spirit of U.S. law or other standards
because researchers did not prioritize the health and safety of patients by
seeking consent.138 Instead, the researchers pursued medical science’s gain
in a developing country with vulnerable people. Although the researchers
may not have been legally bound to seek informed consent, it is more
accurate to characterize them as intentionally avoiding the law. They
deliberately deceived the participants139 and knew their practices would not
be received well in U.S. medical circles.140 In addition, they sought a
testing site in Guatemala, far from the United States’ jurisdiction.
However, if one considers the combination of confusing legal standards and
the regularity of experimenting on human subjects at that time, the context

133. See supra note 91 and accompanying text (suggesting that the Supreme Court
implied that consent to medical procedures, specifically sexual sterilization, must be given
by the individual rather than the State).
134. See supra note 91 and accompanying text (stating that the Supreme Court found
that the State may substitute its consent to a medical procedure, specifically sexual
sterilization, for that of an intellectually disabled person).
135. See supra notes 66–87 and accompanying text (discussing the lack of U.S.
legislation and case law that applied in the international context).
136. See supra note 111 and accompanying text (stating that the Guatemalan
government cooperated so that its people received other medical services).
137. See supra notes 119–26 and accompanying text (discussing the WHO’s goals of
providing the public with an informed opinion).
138. See supra notes 66–87 and accompanying text (discussing the consent
requirements found in U.S. case law and implied in the AMA’s Code).
139. See Reverby, supra note 2, at 16 (“Deception was central [to the researchers of the
study].”).
140. See id. at 18 (“Everyone involved with these studies [in Guatemala] seemed to
know they were treading on complicated ethical grounds.”).
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of the research renders the researchers’ actions more explicable, not more
sympathetic.
II. Modern Informed Consent
The director of the National Institutes for Health, Dr. Francis Collins,
characterized the Guatemala study as “a dark chapter in the history of
medicine.”141 This dark chapter includes a litany of twentieth century U.S.
studies such as STD studies at Tuskegee,142 studies that abused prisoners143
or patients of mental institutions,144 and studies that exploited the poor.145
Unlike the 1940s, there are now a host of modern ethics standards for
conducting research on human subjects outside the United States.146 The
landscape of informed consent has changed significantly, both domestically
and internationally. The CDC asserted human subjects are protected by
federal regulations that require Institutional Review Boards (IRBs) to
monitor research continuously,147 mandate that researchers fully explain the
risks of participation and thereafter acquire informed consent, 148 and
protect vulnerable populations.149
The CDC did not mention the
141.
142.

The CNN Wire Staff, supra note 3.
See generally SUSAN REVERBY, EXAMINING TUSKEGEE: THE INFAMOUS SYPHILIS
STUDY AND ITS LEGACY (Waldo E. Martin Jr. & Patricia Sullivan eds., The University of
North Carolina Press) (2010) (exploring the events of the Tuskegee syphilis experiment and
the implications afterwards for medicine and “American life”).
143. See Allen M. Horblum, They Were Cheap and Available: Prisoners as Research
Subjects in Twentieth Century America, 315 BRIT. MED. J. 1437, 1437–41 (1997) (describing
the history of using prisoners and the shift in the medical community from viewing prisoners
as “raw material for medical experiments” at the beginning of the century to ending the
practice in the 1970s).
144. See generally WEYERS, supra note 57.
145. See id.
146. See, e.g., UNIVERSITY OF SOUTH FLORIDA HUMAN RESEARCH PROTECTION
PROGRAM, POLICY NO. 304: TRANSNATIONAL HUMAN SUBJECTS RESEARCH (2010), available
at http://www.research.usf.edu/dric/hrpp/irbpolicies/Policy%20304%20Transnational%20
Human%20Subjects%20Research.pdf (establishing guidelines for use when USF or a USF
affiliate conducts human subject research outside the United States).
147. See INFORMATION ON PROTECTION, supra note 61, at 2 (“Human subject research is
reviewed and approved by an IRB . . . .”).
148. See id. (“Dr. Cutler and his colleagues used deception to infect vulnerable captive
individuals in Guatemala. This is prohibited today. Researchers must fully explain the risks
associated with their study to all research participants. Participants must indicate their
informed consent.”).
149. See id. (“Current Federal regulations provide additional protections and special
requirements for research involving children and prisoners and instruct IRBs to be cognizant
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effectiveness of international sources in protecting human subjects, but
these sources are still influential and aided in shaping U.S. regulations.150
Ultimately, though there is a concerted effort to regulate human subject
research, exact legal requirements remain confusing, just as informed
consent regulations did at the time of the Guatemala study.
A. The Belmont Report
The Belmont Report was created in 1979 and was one of the first U.S.
efforts to address the ethics of human experimentation.151 Its basic
principles intend to “assist in resolving ethical problems” that arise when
researchers use human subjects.152 The Report values three principles:
respect, beneficence, and justice.153 Respect represents a dual moral
obligation that recognizes not only the right of each individual to exercise
autonomy, but also that a person with diminished capacity (and therefore
diminished autonomy) deserves protection.154
Beneficence obliges
researchers firstly, to do no harm, and secondly, to maximize benefits and

of the special problems of research involving vulnerable populations . . . Studies seeking to
enroll vulnerable subjects must provide additional safeguards to protect the rights and
welfare of these subjects.”).
150. See Joan M. Doherty, Form Over Substance: The Inadequacy of Informed
Consent and Ethical Review for Thai Injection Drug Users Enrolled in HIV Vaccine Trials,
15 PAC. RIM L. & POL’Y J. 101, 112 (2006) (“Nonetheless, the Nuremberg Code and
Declaration of Helsinki . . . have all influenced the creation of law and policy in the United
States.”) (citations omitted).
151. See National Commission for the Protection of Human Subjects of Biomedical and
Behavioral Research, The Belmont Report: Ethical Principles and Guidelines for the
Protection of Human Subjects of Research Summary (1979), available at
http://www.fda.gov/ohrms/dockets/ac/05/briefing/2005-4178b_09_02_Belmont%20
Report.pdf (“[The Belmont Report] is the outgrowth of an intensive four-day period of
discussions that were held in February 1976 at the Smithsonian Institution’s Belmont
Conference Center supplemented by the monthly deliberations of the Commission that were
held over a period of nearly four years.”).
152. See id. (stating that the Belmont Report “is a statement of basic ethical principles
and guidelines that should assist in resolving the ethical problems that surround the conduct
of research with human subjects”).
153. See id. at Part B (“Three basic principles, among those generally accepted in our
cultural tradition, are particularly relevant to the ethics of research involving human
subjects: the principles of respect of persons, beneficence and justice.”).
154. See id. at Part B.1 (“Respect for persons incorporates at least two ethical
convictions: first, that individuals should be treated as autonomous agents, and second, that
persons with diminished autonomy are entitled to protection.”).
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minimize risks.155 The last concept of justice denotes a concern with
distribution of fairness,156 which can be conceptualized as equality.157
In applying the principles of respect, beneficence, and justice,
informed consent emerges as a necessity.158 Informed consent gives
subjects the “opportunity to choose what shall or shall not happen to
them.”159 This opportunity to choose is provided when the elements of
information, comprehension, and voluntariness are satisfied.160 Information
demands sufficient disclosure,161 which includes answering a subject’s
direct inquiries honestly and never withholding information about risks.162
To ensure comprehension, researchers must “adapt the presentation of the
information to the subject’s capacities,”163 and as risks to the subject
increase, so does the obligation to certify comprehension.164 Lastly,
consent must be given voluntarily, without coercion or undue influence.165
155. See id. at Part B.2 (defining beneficence as an obligation; as a result, “[t]wo
general rules have been formulated as complementary expressions of beneficent actions in
this sense: (1) do not harm and (2) maximize possible benefits and minimize possible
harms”).
156. See id. at Part B.3 (stating that justice is choosing “[w]ho ought to receive the
benefits of research and bear its burdens” and “[a]n injustice occurs when some benefit to
which a person is entitled is denied without good reason or when some burden is imposed
unduly”).
157. See id. (“Another way of conceiving the principle of justice is that equals ought to
be treated equally.”).
158. See id. at Part C.1 (“Applications of the general principles to the conduct of
research leads to consideration of the following requirements: informed consent, risk/benefit
assessment, and the selection of subjects of research.”).
159. Id.
160. See id. (stating that the opportunity for choice “is provided when adequate
standards for informed consent are satisfied” and “there is widespread agreement that the
consent process can be analyzed as containing three elements: information, comprehension,
and voluntariness”).
161. See id. (stating that disclosure is “intended to assure that subjects are given
sufficient information” and “[e]ven when some direct benefit to them is anticipated, the
subjects should understand clearly the range of risk and the voluntary nature of
participation”).
162. See id. (“Information about risks should never be withheld for the purpose of
eliciting the cooperation of subjects, and truthful answers should always be given to direct
questions about the research.”).
163. See id. (“Because the subject’s ability to understand is a function of intelligence,
rationality, maturity, and language, it is necessary to adapt the presentation of the
information to the subject’s capacities.”).
164. See id. (“While there is always an obligation to ascertain that the information
about risk to subjects is complete and adequately comprehended, when the risks are more
serious, that obligation increases.”).
165. See id. (“An agreement to participate in research constitutes a valid consent only if
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B. The DHHS & the FDA’s Current Regulations

Building on the Belmont Report’s ethical foundation,166 the central
improvement to U.S. legal standards since the Guatemala study is federal
regulation. The Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) and
the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) regulate all experiments
involving human subjects in a dovetailing fashion so that at times they
govern jointly and at other times independently.167
The DHHS binds fifteen U.S. agencies168 and broadly oversees all
human experiments that are “conducted, supported or otherwise subject to
regulation by any federal department or agency.”169 Because the DHHS’s
authority stems from the Spending Clause,170 its regulation is limited to
instances where U.S. funds are involved.171 DHHS regulations are known
voluntarily given. This element of informed consent requires conditions free of coercion and
undue influence.”).
166. See Doherty, supra note 153, at 114 (“By promoting the concepts of respect for
persons, beneficence, and justice, the Belmont Report provides the ethical foundation for the
current federal laws governing research on human subjects in the United States.”).
167. See Couture, supra note 66, at 134 (“The two agencies work in an interlocking
system in which one or both govern all human experiments.”) (citing Sharona
Hoffman, Regulating Clinical Research: Informed Consent, Privacy and IRBs, 31 CAP. U.
L. REV. 71, 76 (2003)).
168. See Yevengia Shtilman, Pharmaceutical Drug Testing in the Former Soviet
Union: Contract Research Organizations as Broker-Dealers in an Emerging Testing
Ground for America’s Big Pharma, 29 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 425, 438 (2009) (“Perhaps
the most important regulation pertaining to human trials conducted both within and outside
the United States to date is the DHHS policy for the protection of human subjects, referred
to as the Common Rule because it binds fifteen agencies in addition to DHHS.”) (citing
Markus Schott, Medical Research on Humans: Regulation in Switzerland, the European
Union and the United States, 60 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 45, 65 (2005)).
169. See Protection of Human Subjects, 45 C.F.R. § 46.101(a) (2010); see also Sharona
Hoffman, Regulating Clinical Research: Informed Consent, Privacy, and IRBs, 31 CAP. U.
L. REV. 71, 75–76 (2003) (“Clinical trials that involve treatments other than drugs and
devices, such as surgery or bone marrow transplants, are not regulated by the FDA and are
subject to DHHS regulation only if they are ‘conducted, supported or otherwise subject to
regulation by any federal department or agency.’”).
170. See Robert Charrow, Protection of Human Subjects: Is Expansive Regulation
Counter-Productive?, 101 NW. U. L. REV. 707, 713 (2007) (“The Common Rule [of the
DHHS] is a child of the Spending Clause—the constitutional provision that authorizes the
federal government to spend money and, by implication, to impose conditions on the receipt
of that money.”) (citing U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1; South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203,
212 (1987)).
171. See Doherty, supra note 150, at 114–15 (“[R]esearch that is entirely funded by
private sources (rather than government sources) lacks the requisite federal nexus for the
Common Rule [of the DHHS] to apply.”) (citing 45 C.F.R. § 46.101(a)).
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as the “Common Rule,” and they require informed consent and Institutional
Review Boards for all government-funded research.172 The FDA is an
agency under the DHHS,173 but it derives its authority from the Commerce
Clause.174 The FDA’s scope is also limited to regulating clinical trials that
develop new drugs and devices.175 The FDA regulates private companies
that “research on populations outside of the United States . . . if the
company ultimately intends to seek FDA approval for use of the product in
the United States.”176 The FDA has protections similar to the Common
Rule, but did not elect to incorporate it.177 Instead, the FDA requires
compliance with additional protocols.178 As a result, the Common Rule
governs research funded by the U.S. government, but private entities are
regulated only if they seek FDA approval.179 Nevertheless, no matter which
agency governs, both require informed consent and IRBs.180
172. See 45 C.F.R. §§ 46.101–.505 (2010) (outlining various regulations for federally
funded medical research involving human subjects); see also Gail Javitt, Why Not Take All
of Me? Reflections on the Immortal Life of Henrietta Lacks and the Status of Participants in
Research Using Human Specimens, 11 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 713, 713 (2010) (“The
‘Common Rule,’ as the federal human subject protection regulations are known as, sets forth
requirements for the protection of all human subjects of federally funded research.”) (citing
45 C.F.R. §§ 46.101–.505 (2009)).
173. See Couture, supra note 66, at 134 (“Although the FDA is an agency under the
Department of Health and Human Services, it has taken the frontal role of regulating human
experimentation, specifically in the areas of pharmaceuticals, biologies and medical
devices.”) (citing Sharona Hoffman, Regulating Clinical Research: Informed Consent,
Privacy and IRBs, 31 CAP. U. L. REV. 71, 76 (2003)).
174. See Charrow, supra note 170, at 713 (“[T]he FDA derives its jurisdiction from the
Commerce Clause.”) (citing U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3).
175. See Enforcement Policy, 21 C.F.R. § 7.3(f) (2010) (defining the “products” under
FDA jurisdiction as “including any food, drug, and device intended for human or animal use,
any cosmetic and biologic intended for human use”).
176. Doherty, supra note 150, at 115.
177. See id. (“The FDA did not sign on to the Common Rule, and therefore has a
separate basis for regulating research on human subjects.”) (citations omitted).
178. See id. (stating that a sponsor of a drug or vaccine “must file an investigational
new drug application (‘IND’) with the FDA[, and i]f IND approval is secured by an
investigator, then the study may begin, subject to strict compliance with the protocols
accepted by the FDA”) (citing DALE E. HAMMERSCHMIDT, UNDERSTANDING THE FDA’S IND
PROCESS, IN INSTITUTIONAL REVIEW BOARD: MANAGEMENT AND FUNCTION 323, 325 (Robert
J. Amdur & Elizabeth A. Bankert eds., 2002)).
179. See id. (“[T]he federal system of protections applies only to research funded by a
federal agency that is subject to the Common Rule, and to private entities that will ultimately
seek FDA review and approval.”) (citing INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, RESPONSIBLE RESEARCH:
A SYSTEMS APPROACH TO PROTECTING RESEARCH PARTICIPANTS 138 (2003)).
180. See supra note 172 and accompanying text (discussing that both the Common Rule
and the FDA require informed consent and IRBs).
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The informed consent requirements of the Common Rule and the FDA
are “virtually identical.”181 At a minimum, researchers must disclose the
purpose of the research, its procedures; any “reasonably foreseeable” risks
and discomforts; reasonable benefits of participation; any alternative and
beneficial procedures; the confidentiality of the records kept; compensation
and availability of medical treatment for injury; contact information for
questions or in case of injury; and a statement that participation is voluntary
and at-will.182 Even if a participant signs a document indicating consent,
the document is merely a record of informed consent; not informed consent
itself.183 Researchers must ensure that when presenting information and
receiving a signature, the participant gives bona fide consent.184
The Common Rule and the FDA also require Institutional Review
Boards.185 The purpose of an IRB is to protect the rights and welfare of
human subjects,186 so IRBs have specific approval criteria for a proposed
clinical trial as well as standards the trial must maintain.187 Before an IRB
may approve a clinical trial, the IRB follows the Belmont Report’s
requirements by ensuring that “(1) informed consent is obtained from
subjects and documented (respect for persons, or autonomy),188 (2) the risks
181. See Doherty, supra note 150, at 116 (“The general requirements for informed
consent are virtually identical in the Common Rule and the FDA regulations.”) (citations
omitted).
182. See 45 C.F.R. § 46.116(a) (2010) (listing the Common Rule’s elements of
informed consent); see also 21 C.F.R. § 50.25 (2010) (listing the FDA’s elements of
informed consent).
183. See Doherty, supra note 150, at 116–17 (“A document with a signature is not
consent, but is merely a record of what was supposed to have been communicated between
researchers and prospective participants.”) (citations omitted).
184. See id. at 116 (“It is important for investigators to understand the difference
between ‘the presentation of the information, and even the signing of the consent document,
and bona fide consent.’”) (quoting ROBIN L. PENSLAR, THE IRB’S ROLE IN EDITING THE
CONSENT DOCUMENT, IN INSTITUTIONAL REVIEW BOARD: MANAGEMENT AND FUNCTION 233
(Robert J. Amdur & Elizabeth A. Bankert eds., 2002)).
185. See id. (stating one of the primary protections required by the Common Rule and
the FDA regulations is “prior review of proposed research by an independent ethical review
committee”) (citing Ezekiel J. Emanuel et al., Oversight of Human Participants Research:
Identifying Problems to Evaluate Reform Proposals, 141 ANNALS OF INTERNAL MED. 282,
282 (2004)).
186. See Institutional Review Boards, 21 C.F.R. § 56.102(g) (2010) (stating the primary
purpose of an IRB’s “review is to assure the protection of the rights and welfare of the
human subjects”).
187. See Hoffman, supra note 169, at 77–78 (describing the details of IRB
requirements).
188. Doherty supra note 150, at 117 (citing 45 C.F.R. §§ 46.111(a)(4) & (5) (2005); 21
C.F.R. §§ 56.111(a)(4) & (5) (2005)).
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to subjects are minimized and are reasonable in relation to benefits
(beneficence),189 and (3) the selection of subjects is equitable (justice).”190
Moreover, the proposed clinical trial must be sensitive to vulnerable
populations such as children, prisoners, pregnant women, mentally disabled
persons, and economically or educationally disadvantaged persons.191 Even
with these requirements, IRBs have a great deal of discretion and may
require disclosure of additional information if “the information would
meaningfully add to the protection of the rights and welfare of subjects.”192
Despite the protections of informed consent and IRBs, the Common
Rule contains loopholes and the FDA’s oversight may be inapplicable.
Research in foreign countries may substitute compliance with foreign
procedures for the Common Rule if the “procedures . . . afford protections
that are at least equivalent” to the Common Rule, which opens the
possibility for relaxed oversight.193 Also, because research must have a
federal nexus for the Common Rule to apply,194 the DHHS cannot regulate
privately funded research.195 Fortunately, the FDA is not so restricted and
can regulate private clinical trials that develop new drugs and devices to be
marketed in the United States.196 In fact, the FDA does not “permit reliance
189. Id. (citing 45 C.F.R. §§ 46.111(a)(1) & (2) (2005); 21 C.F.R. §§ 56.111(a)(1) &
(2) (2005)).
190. Id. (citing 45 C.F.R. § 46.111(a)(3) (2005); 21 C.F.R. § 56.111(a)(3) (2005)).
191. See 45 C.F.R. § 46.111(b) (2010) (requiring the inclusion of additional safeguards
in studies to protect the rights and welfare of vulnerable subjects from the effects of coercion
and undue influence); see also 21 C.F.R. § 56.111(b) (2010) (stating that additional
safeguards are included in the study when some or all of the subjects are likely to be
vulnerable to coercion or undue influence).
192. 45 C.F.R. § 46.109(b) (2010); 21 C.F.R. § 56.109 (2010).
193. See 45 C.F.R. § 46.101(h) (2010) (“[I]f a department or agency head determines
that the procedures prescribed by the institution afford protections that are at least equivalent
to those provided in this policy, the department or agency head may approve the substitution
of the foreign procedures in lieu of [this policy’s] procedural requirements . . . .”).
194. See 45 C.F.R. § 46.101(a) (stating that the DHHS’s authority “applies to all
research involving human subjects conducted, supported or otherwise subject to regulation
by any federal department or agency which takes appropriate administrative action to make
the policy applicable to such research”); see also Doherty, supra note 150, at 115
(“[R]esearch that is entirely funded by private sources (rather than government sources)
lacks the requisite federal nexus for the Common Rule [of the DHHS] to apply.”) (citing 45
C.F.R. § 46.101(a)).
195. See Doherty, supra note 150, at 115 (“In the case of privately-funded research by
pharmaceutical companies, the federal government would need an additional basis [other
than the Common Rule] for regulating.”).
196. See 21 C.F.R. § 7.3(f) (2010) (stating that the FDA has jurisdiction over articles,
“including any food, drug, and device intended for human or animal use, any cosmetic and
biologic intended for human use”).
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on a host country’s ethics guidelines.”197 The FDA may only regulate a
private actor that intends to market the drug in the United States.198
Consequently, private companies that engage in clinical research overseas
but opt not to market their product in the United States are subject to no
federal oversight. Without federal oversight, participants could be exposed
to abusive practices.
Unfortunately, federal protections have been labeled an “elaborate
ritual” both because participants do not actually understand risks and
benefits199 and because frequently “the informed consent process serves
only to insulate the researcher from subsequent malpractice claims and fails
to provide the subject with the prospective benefit intended by the
doctrine.”200 Moreover, IRBs have been criticized for not protecting human
subjects effectively due to conflicts of interest201 (despite federal
prohibitions),202 for valuing success of the experiment over ethics,203 and
197. Remigius N. Nwabueze, Ethical Review of Research Involving Human Test
Subjects in Nigeria: Legal and Policy Issues, 14 IND. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 87, 110 (2003).
198. See Doherty, supra note 150, at 115 (“[T]he federal system of protections applies
only to research funded by a federal agency that is subject to the Common Rule, and to
private entities that will ultimately seek FDA review and approval.”) (citing INSTITUTE OF
MEDICINE, RESPONSIBLE RESEARCH: A SYSTEMS APPROACH TO PROTECTING RESEARCH
PARTICIPANTS 138 (2003)).
199. See Grimm, supra note 81, at 46 (“[T]he informed consent process for research
has been characterized as an ‘elaborate ritual’ that does not result in true informed consent
because of a lack of understanding regarding the risks and benefits of participation.”) (citing
Sandra J. Carnahan, Promoting Medical Research Without Sacrificing Patient Autonomy:
Legal and Ethical Issues Raised by the Waiver of Informed Consent for Emergency
Research, 52 OKLA. L. REV. 565, 575 (1999)).
200. Id. (citing Sandra J. Carnahan, Promoting Medical Research Without Sacrificing
Patient Autonomy: Legal and Ethical Issues Raised by the Waiver of Informed Consent for
Emergency Research, 52 OKLA. L. REV. 565, 575 (1999)).
201. See id. at 62–63 ("Some argue that an inherent conflict of interest exists because
IRB members are potentially reluctant to pass judgment on their own colleagues’ research
due to the fact that they could find themselves applying to an IRB in the future for
permission to conduct research.”) (citing Sandra J. Carnahan, Promoting Medical Research
Without Sacrificing Patient Autonomy: Legal and Ethical Issues Raised by the Waiver of
Informed Consent for Emergency Research, 52 OKLA. L. REV. 565, 586–87 (1999)).
202. See Protection of Human Subjects, 45 C.F.R § 46.107(e) (2010) (“No IRB may
have a member participate in [an] initial or continuing review of any project in which the
member has a conflicting interest.”); see also Grimm, supra note 81, at 63 (stating the
conflict of interest problem “persists despite the fact that the federal regulations prohibit
members with conflicts of interest from participating within the IRB”) (citations omitted).
203. See Grimm, supra note 81, at 63 (“IRBs can also experience difficulty in
remaining true to their mission. In Grimes v. Kennedy Krieger Institute, Inc., a Maryland
appellate court stated that IRBs can place a premium on the success of experiments, often to
the detriment of the ethicality of experiments.”) (citing Grimes v. Kennedy Krieger Inst.,
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for inadequate review.204 As a result, even though the Belmont Report’s
principles are reflected in U.S. regulation, ethics glitches persist.205
C. International Guidelines
Since the Guatemala study, not only have domestic regulations
developed, but international guidelines have also blossomed. Modern
informed consent typically requires that the human subject (or legally
authorized representative) voluntarily consent to participate after being
informed in a manner he or she understands.206 The two leading guidelines
are the Nuremberg Code and the Declaration of Helsinki, but other
international guidelines that address informed consent and continue to
influence the United States include the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights and the World Health Organization’s Guidelines for Good
Clinical Practice.
One of the first international guidelines was the Nuremberg Code,
which was created in 1947 in response to Nazi medical experimentation.207
The Code finds voluntary informed consent “absolutely essential.”208
Additionally, an experiment should avoid unnecessary pain and injury to
participants,209 and subjects must have “sufficient knowledge and
comprehension of the elements of the subjects matter involved . . . to make
Inc., 782 A.2d 807, 817 (Md. 2001)).
204. See id. at 63–64 (stating a report presented to the Government Reform and
Oversight Committee of the U.S. House of Representatives in 1998 “concluded that IRBs
conducted only minimal ongoing review of research, . . . that too much was reviewed at too
great a speed, that insufficient resources were allocated,” and that “little training was
provided”) (citations omitted).
205. See supra notes 188-92 and accompanying text (discussing how the Belmont
Report’s principles are reflected in U.S. federal regulations).
206. See, e.g., Doherty, supra note 150, at 110 (“Informed consent provides a process
for ensuring and documenting that a research participant (or his or her legally authorized
representative) has acted according to his or her informed, considered, and freely made
judgment.”) (citations omitted).
207. See Sarah Bahir, An International Legal System Regulating the Trade in the
Pharmaceutical Sector and Services Provided by Human Subjects, 6 ASPER REV. INT'L BUS.
& TRADE L. 157, 165 (2006) (“In response to the Doctors Trial (1946-1947), the Nuremberg
Code was designed to safeguard the rights of subjects in medical research.”) (citations
omitted).
208. See NUREMBERG CODE (1947), available at http://www.fhi.org/training/en/
RETC2/Resources/nuremburg_code.pdf (“The voluntary consent of the human subject is
absolutely essential.”).
209. See id. (“The experiment should be so conducted as to avoid all unnecessary
physical and mental suffering and injury.”).
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an understanding and enlightened decision” to participate.210 The Code has
never been adopted or ratified by the United States,211 and it may have lost
current application as more expansive ethics guidelines have formed.212
Still, “courts in the United States have allowed the Code to be introduced as
evidence of ethical principles existing in customary international law.”213
Because it was initially believed that the Nuremberg Code applied
only to war crimes, not physicians,214 organizations created other ethical
guidelines.215 In 1964 the World Medical Association adopted the
Declaration of Helsinki, and it is now the most renowned set of guidelines
for human research.216 From 1978 to 2008 it was referenced in FDA
regulations as a general ethical guideline.217 Unlike the Nuremberg Code,
the Declaration does not mandate informed consent.218 It requires
researchers, however, to inform subjects of anticipated benefits, risks, and

210. Id.
211. See Shtilman, supra note 168, at 448 (“The United States has neither ratified nor
adopted the Nuremberg Code.”) (citing Grimes v. Kennedy Krieger Inst., Inc., 782 A.2d
807, 850 (Md. 2001); Ammend v. Bioport, Inc., 322 F. Supp. 2d 848, 872 (W.D. Mich.
2004)).
212. See Bahir, supra note 207, at 165 (“The Nuremberg Code has historical
significance; but, its current application has . . . waned as more expansive ethical codes have
risen.”).
213. Shtilman, supra note 168, at 449 (citations omitted).
214. See Doherty, supra note 150, at 111 (“For many years after the creation of the
Nuremberg Code, most physicians believed that the Code primarily applied to war crimes,
and not to the medical establishment.”) (citing Joanne Roman, U.S. Medical Research in the
Developing World: Ignoring Nuremberg, 11 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 441, 451 (2002)).
215. See id. (“Subsequent documents developed by international organizations provided
guidelines for ethics in research, and were intended to apply to multinational and
intranational research.”).
216. See Bahir, supra note 207, at 165 (“The Declaration of Helsinki, adopted in 1964
by the World Medical Association, is the most recognized set of guidelines in the area of
biomedical research.”).
217. See Adam H. Laughton, Note, Somewhere to Run, Somewhere to Hide?:
International Regulation of Human Subject Experimentation, 18 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L.
181, 196 (2007) (“The Declaration was signed by the United States in 1975 and incorporated
by the FDA into their regulations for overseas clinical research that same year. In spite of
having been adopted into FDA regulations, the Declaration is a general statement of ethics,
not a collection of legally binding principles.”) (citations omitted).
218. See DECLARATION OF HELSINKI Part B.13 (2000), available at
http://ohsr.od.nih.gov/guidelines/helsinki.html (last visited Apr. 2, 2012) (“After ensuring
that the subject has understood the information, the physician should then obtain the
subject’s freely-given informed consent, preferably in writing. If the consent cannot be
obtained in writing, the non-written consent must be formally documented and witnessed.”)
(on file with the Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice).
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potential discomfort,219 and vulnerable populations are afforded special
protections.220 The Declaration, like U.S. federal regulations,221 suggests
ethical review committees,222 whereas the Nuremberg Code places ethical
responsibility directly with researchers.223 The Declaration is not legally
binding on the United States,224 although its “principles have been followed
in other international, regional, and national guidelines and regulations.”225
Despite the influential value of the other guidelines, the only legally
binding treaty on the United States is the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights (ICCPR).226 Article 7 of the ICCPR states, “[n]o one
shall be subject to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or
punishment. In particular, no one shall be subjected without his free
219. See id. (“In any research on human beings, each potential subject must be
adequately informed of the aims, methods, sources of funding, any possible conflicts of
interest, institutional affiliations of the researcher, the anticipated benefits and potential risks
of the study and the discomfort it may entail.”).
220. See id. at Part A.8 (“Some research populations are vulnerable and need special
protection. The particular needs of the economically and medically disadvantaged must be
recognized.”).
221. See Shtilman, supra note 168, at 448 (“U.S. federal regulations depart from the
Code’s emphasis on the researcher’s authority in that they place responsibility with research
institutions and IRBs rather than with the researchers themselves.”) (citing Adam H.
Laughton, Note, Somewhere to Run, Somewhere to Hide?: International Regulation of
Human Subject Experimentation, 18 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 181, 194 (2007)).
222. See DECLARATION OF HELSINKI, supra note 218, at Part B.4 (stating that
independent ethical review committees have “the right to monitor ongoing trials,” and
should provide guidance and approval on ethical issues, and “be in conformity with the laws
and regulations of the country in which the research experiment is performed”).
223. See Shtilman, supra note 168, at 447 (“Unlike the FDA regulations and the
Declaration of Helsinki, the Nuremberg Code places the responsibility of ensuring ethical
medical experimentation directly in the hands of researchers.”) (citing James
Cekola, Outsourcing Drug Investigations to India: A Comment on U.S., Indian and
International Regulation of Clinical Trials in Cross-Border Pharmaceutical Research, 28
Nw. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 125, 144 (2007)).
224. See Daniels, supra note 13, at 213–14 (stating the Declaration of Helsinki is
“accepted by the international medical community as providing for the highest standards of
medical ethics in human experimentation, although in most countries, [including the United
States], [it] lacks the force of law”) (citing Barry R. Bloom, The Highest Attainable
Standard: Ethical Issues in AIDS Vaccines, 279 SCI. 186, 186 (1998)).
225. See Bahir, supra note 207, at 166 (citations omitted).
226. See Kristen Farrell, Human Experimentation in Developing Countries: Improving
International Practices by Identifying Vulnerable Populations and Allocating Fair Benefits,
9 J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL’Y 136, 143 (2006) (“The ICCPR is the only legally binding
international treaty concerning human experimentation.”) (citing Finnuala Kelleher, Note,
The Pharmaceutical Industry’s Responsibility for Protecting Human Subjects of Clinical
Trials in Developing Nations, 38 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 67, 73 (2004)).
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consent to medical or scientific experimentation.”227 Unfortunately, the
ICCPR is self-enforcing and applies only to state actors; aside from
establishing informed consent as a principle of law, it merely imparts
abstract rights.228
More practically, as part of “an effort to harmonize the Code of
Federal Regulations with other international standards for human clinical
trials,”229 the WHO issued the Guidelines for Good Clinical Practice (GCP)
in 1995 with the goal of setting globally applicable standards for trial of
private pharmaceutical products.230 The GCP adopt the ethical principles
delineated in the Declaration of Helsinki,231 but further emphasize the
application of ethics—a priority previous codes lacked.232 Moreover,
member countries are encouraged to enact national regulations.233 If no
national regulations exist, countries are encouraged to adopt the GCP.234 In
fact, the FDA permits the GCP to be a substitute for FDA regulations in
certain circumstances.235
227. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, part III, art. 6(1), Dec. 16,
1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 and 1057 U.N.T.S. 407, entered into force 23 Mar. 1976 [the
provisions of article 41 (Human Rights Committee) entered into force 28 Mar. 1979],
available at http://www2.ohchr.org/english/law/ccpr.htm#art4 (last visited Apr. 2, 2012) (on
file with the Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice).
228. See Finnuala Kelleher, Note, The Pharmaceutical Industry’s Responsibility for
Protecting Human Subjects of Clinical Trials in Developing Nations, 38 COLUM. J.L. & SOC.
PROBS. 67, 73 (2004) (“[W]hile the ICCPR confers absolute rights, it applies only to state
actors and is not self-enforcing. It established informed consent as a principle of
international law, but did little more.”).
229. Shtilman, supra note 168, at 438.
230. See World Health Organization, Guidelines for Good Clinical Practice (GCP) for
Trials
on
Pharmaceutical
Products
introduction
(1995),
available
at
http://apps.who.int/medicinedocs/pdf/whozip13e/whozip13e.pdf (last visited Apr. 2, 2012)
(“The purpose of these WHO Guidelines for Good Clinical Practice (GCP) for trials on
pharmaceutical products is to set globally applicable standards for the conduct of such
biomedical research on human subjects.”).
231. See id. at art. 1.2 (“All research involving human subjects should be conducted in
accordance with the ethical principles contained in the current version of the Declaration of
Helsinki.”).
232. See Bahir, supra note 207, at 167 (“The WHO guidelines emphasize the
implementation of the ethical principles, which was lacking in previous guidelines.”).
233. See World Health Organization, supra note 230, at art. 1.5 (“Countries in which
clinical trials are performed should have regulations governing the way in which these
studies can be conducted.”).
234. See id. (“In countries where regulations do not exist or require supplementation,
relevant government officials may designate, in part or in whole, these Guidelines as the
basis on which clinical trials will be conducted.”).
235. See Investigational New Drug Application, 21 C.F.R. § 312.120 (2010) (stating
that FDA will accept a “well-designed and well-conducted foreign clinical study not
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The GCP is fashioned after the Declaration of Helsinki,236 so a
researcher only “should” seek informed consent.237 Like the Declaration of
Helsinki and U.S. federal regulations, the GCP suggests a prospective
independent ethics committee238 that conducts prospective239 and ongoing
review.240 Still, the GCP protects vulnerable groups241 and enumerates
information242 that should be provided “in a language and at a level of
complexity understandable to the subject.”243
III. Parallels with the Guatemala Study: Compliance & Exploitation
Despite domestic regulations and international ethics created since the
Guatemala study, U.S. researchers often do not comply with these
regulations and codes. The problem is that since the 1990s there has been a
boom of “international health care research, especially in clinical drug and
vaccine trials funded by sponsors in wealthy countries and conducted in
conducted under an IND” if it meets the conditions of GCP and “the FDA is able to validate
the data from the study through an onsite inspection if the agency deems it necessary”).
236. See World Health Organization, supra note 230, at art. 1.2 (1995), available at
http://apps.who.int/medicinedocs/pdf/whozip13e/whozip13e.pdf (last visited Apr. 2, 2012)
(“All research involving human subjects should be conducted in accordance with the ethical
principles contained in the current version of the Declaration of Helsinki.”).
237. See id. at art. 3.3 (“The principles of informed consent in the current revisions of
the Declaration of Helsinki and the International Ethical Guidelines for Biomedical Research
Involving Human Subjects should be implemented in each clinical trial.”) (emphasis added).
238. See id. at art. 3.2 (“The ethics committee should be constituted and operated so
that its tasks can be executed free from bias and from any influence of those who are
conducting the trial.”).
239. See id. (“Subjects must not be entered into the trial until the relevant ethics
committee(s) has issued its favourable opinion on the procedures.”).
240. See id. (stating the committee “has an ongoing responsibility for the ethical
conduct of research” so it must be “informed of subsequent amendments to protocol[,] any
serious adverse events that occur during the trial, or other information likely to affect the
safety of the subjects or conduct of the trial”).
241. See id. at art. 3.3(e), (f) (discussing the necessity of specially protecting children,
adults who are unable to give consent, “patients with incurable diseases, people in nursing
homes, prisoners or detainees, the unemployed or people on a very low income, patients in
emergency departments, some ethnic and racial minority groups, the homeless, nomads and
refugees”).
242. World Health Organization, supra note 230, at art. 3.3(d) (stating subject consent
is acceptable only if one explains “the aim of the study; the expected benefits for the subjects
and/or others; the possibility of allocation to a reference treatment or placebo; the risks and
inconveniences—e.g. invasive procedures; and, where appropriate, an explanation of
alternative, recognized medical therapy”).
243. Id. at art. 3.3(a).
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developing nations.”244
This boom results in susceptibility for a
Guatemala-like study recurring because the protections for human subjects
are not enforced sufficiently. It is important to recognize parallels between
the Guatemala study and modern practices in order to understand that
modern informed consent issues echo ethical issues in the Guatemala study.
Dubious medical experiments that are similar to the Guatemala study
and funded by U.S. grants continue to occur both overseas and within the
United States.245 For example, the United States, via the Centers for
Disease Control and Prevention and the National Institutes of Health, has
funded AIDS research in locations such as Haiti,246 Thailand, the
Dominican Republic, and several African countries.247 Yet, reports have
shown that researchers either ignored ethical standards248 or facially
complied with standards but did not seek actual informed consent.249 In
fact, the revision of the Declaration of Helsinki in 2000 was due partly to
the United States’ lack of compliance with its own legal standards.250
244. Farrell, supra note 226, at 136; see also Abdullahi v. Pfizer, Inc., 562 F.3d 163,
186 n.16 (2d Cir. N.Y. 2009) (“In the United States, for example, the number of foreign
clinical investigators conducting drug research under an IND increased sixteen-fold in the
1990s.”) (citations omitted).
245. See, e.g., WEYERS, supra note 57, at 594–99 (discussing experiments within the
United States that occurred during the 1990s that resulted in death to participants due to
noncompliance with the FDA’s regulations).
246. See, e.g., Daniels, supra note 13, at 203–24 (discussing the ethics of a study
conducted by Cornell University in Haiti that was largely funded by the United States, the
violations of international law, and the lack of redress for the victims in U.S. courts).
247. See, e.g., Jay Dyckman, The Myth of Informed Consent: An Analysis of the
Doctrine of Informed Consent and Its (Mis)application in HIV Experiments on Pregnant
Women in Developing Countries, 9 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 91, 92 (1999) (“Since 1997, the
Centers for Disease Control (CDC) and the National Institutes of Health (NIH) have paid for
and conducted experiments on pregnant women infected with HIV in Thailand, the
Dominican Republic, and several African nations.”).
248. See Benjamin M. Meier, International Protection of Persons Undergoing Medical
Experimentation: Protecting the Right of Informed Consent, 20 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 513,
516 (2002) (“Although U.S. government agencies were conducting the testing [at the
African AZT trials], these experiments took place without regard for U.S. medical research
standards, which require . . . that patients be fully informed of all possible treatment options
and that they receive, at a minimum, the prevailing standard of care.”) (citations omitted).
249. See Dyckman, supra note 247, at 94 (discussing “the problematic nature of
structuring a test regimen on the condition of the freely obtained consent of individuals who
are not similarly situated to the researchers in terms of power or resources”).
250. See ADRIANA PETRYNA, WHEN EXPERIMENTS TRAVEL: CLINICAL TRIALS AND THE
GLOBAL SEARCH FOR HUMAN SUBJECTS 33–35 (2009) (stating the debate over the ethics of
the clinical trials in Africa that used “AZT treatment to halt perinatal transmission of HIV”
prompted the revision of the Declaration of Helsinki).
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In addition to research funded by the United States, research
conducted by American pharmaceutical companies also contains risk of
noncompliance with ethics. The opportunity for risk is actually greater
because the pharmaceutical industry pilots healthcare research that was
once primarily conducted by the U.S. government.251 This phenomenon is
due largely to the fact that Americans have become increasingly reluctant to
participate in drug trials,252 so private companies are “gravitating to
developing countries because of lower costs, the prevalence of diseases, and
seemingly limitless numbers of impoverished patients.”253 The lack of
adequate protections in the context of privately funded research has been
evident in studies conducted in “broken, impoverished countries” such as
Russia, India, South Africa as well as other Eastern European, Latin
American, Asian, and African countries.254
One recent case, Abdullahi v. Pfizer, Inc.,255 illustrates problems with
private companies using vulnerable populations for human subjects;256 its
circumstances are strikingly similar to those of the Guatemala study in both
its methods and in its approach to informed consent. In 1996, Pfizer, one of
the world’s largest pharmaceutical companies,257 was seeking FDA
251. See Christine D. Galbraith, Dying to Know: A Demand for Genuine Public Access
to Clinical Trial Results Data, 78 MISS. L.J. 705, 708 (2009) (“The pharmaceutical industry
now substantially overshadows the federal government as the single greatest source of
financial support for conducting clinical trials.”) (citing Shankar Vedantam, Drugmakers
Prefer Silence on Test Data, WASH. POST, July 6, 2004, at A1).
252. See Shtilman, supra note 171, at 425 (“Pharmaceutical manufacturers have found
Americans increasingly hesitant to participate in drug experiments because of skepticism
about their safety.”) (citing SONIA SHAH, THE BODY HUNTERS: TESTING NEW DRUGS ON THE
WORLD’S POOREST PATIENTS 4–5 (2006)).
253. Farrell, supra note 226, at 136 (citing Finnuala Kelleher, Note, The
Pharmaceutical Industry’s Responsibility for Protecting Human Subjects of Clinical Trials
in Developing Nations, 38 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 67, 67 (2004)).
254. See SONIA SHAH, THE BODY HUNTERS: TESTING NEW DRUGS ON THE WORLD’S
POOREST PATIENTS 7 (2006) (“The most popular destinations [for drug companies angling for
FDA approval] are not Western Europe and Japan, but rather the broken, impoverished
countries of Eastern Europe and Latin America. Russia, India, South Africa, and other
Asian and African countries have proven equally fruitful.”) (citations omitted).
255. Abdullahi v. Pfizer, Inc., 562 F.3d 163, 187 (2d Cir. N.Y. 2009) (holding that the
appellants had “pled facts sufficient to state a cause of action under the ATS for a violation
of the norm of customary international law prohibiting medical experimentation on human
subjects without their consent”).
256. See Farrell, supra note 226, at 137 (“Abdullahi v. Pfizer, Inc. illustrates the
problems that arise when vulnerable populations suffer as a result of their participation in
clinical research studies.”).
257. See id. (stating that Pfizer is “the world’s largest pharmaceutical company”) (citing
PFIZER INC.: World’s Largest, Research-based, Pharmaceutical Company
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approval for its antibiotic Trovafloxacin Mesylate, marketed as “Trovan.”258
In Kano, Nigeria, three American and four Nigerian physicians (in
conjunction with the Nigerian government) conducted clinical trials with
children who were patients at Nigeria’s Infectious Disease Hospital.259
Trovan had never been tested on children in that form and previous animal
tests had serious side effects.260 The children were given no follow-up care,
and eleven children died with many others left blind, paralyzed, deaf, or
brain-damaged.261
Nigerian children brought suit in U.S. federal courts under the Alien
Tort Statute (ATS) alleging that Pfizer, working in partnership with the
Nigerian government, violated a customary international norm that
prohibited involuntary medical experimentation when it tested Trovan
without obtaining consent from the children or explaining the risks.262
Despite FDA regulations, no Institutional Review Board had approved the
trial.263 Although the district court dismissed the action for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction under the ATS, the Second Circuit decided that the
district court reached that conclusion incorrectly264 and remanded the case
Created, BIOTECH WEEK, May 14, 2003, at 94).
258. See Abdullahi, 562 F.3d at 169 (stating that the Plaintiff’s alleged that Pfizer
“sought to gain the approval of the U.S. Food and Drug Administration for the use on
children of its new antibiotic, Trovafloxacin Mesylate, marketed as ‘Trovan’”).
259. See id. at 169 (contending that Pfizer “dispatched three of its American physicians
to work with four Nigerian doctors to experiment with Trovan on children who were patients
in Nigeria’s Infectious Disease Hospital in Kano, Nigeria”). “Working in concert with
Nigerian government officials, the team allegedly recruited two hundred sick children who
sought treatment . . . .” Id.
260. See id. (“Appellants contend that Pfizer knew that Trovan had never previously
been tested on children in the form being used and that animal tests showed that Trovan had
life-threatening side effects, including joint disease, abnormal cartilage growth, liver
damage, and a degenerative bone condition.”).
261. See Abdullahi v. Pfizer, Inc., 562 F.3d 163, 169 (2d Cir. N.Y. 2009) (“Pfizer
allegedly concluded the experiment and left without administering follow-up care.”).
“According to the appellants, the tests caused the deaths of eleven children, five of whom
had taken Trovan and six of whom had taken the lowered dose of Ceftriaxone, and left many
others blind, deaf, paralyzed, or brain-damaged.” Id.
262. See id. at 168 (stating the plaintiffs alleged Pfizer “violated a customary
international law norm prohibiting involuntary medical experimentation on humans when it
tested an experimental antibiotic on children in Nigeria, including themselves, without their
consent or knowledge”).
263. See id. at 170 (“The appellants allege that, in an effort to rapidly secure FDA
approval, Pfizer hastily assembled its test protocol at its research headquarters. . . .
Appellants [also] allege, however, . . . that at the time the letter was purportedly written, the
IDH had no ethics committee.”).
264. See id. at 169 (stating “that the district court incorrectly determined that the
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because it found that informed consent is a norm of international law.265
The court stated that “[t]he administration of drug trials without informed
consent on the scale alleged in the complaints poses a real threat to
international peace and security.”266
Abdullahi takes place in recent times, but it illustrates similar problems
as those present in the Guatemala study. Both studies experimented on
vulnerable populations, both contained deficiencies in informed consent
procedures to develop a new drug as quickly as possible, and both involved
U.S. and foreign doctors and governments that condoned such actions. The
Guatemala study was secret and was never litigated, but the Nigerian
children (or their families) have the possibility of recourse under the
ATS.267 It remains to be seen what the final result will be of Abdullahi on
remand, but if nothing else, it demonstrates a contemporary example of the
limitations of current informed consent standards and shows the
applicability of lessons that may be learned from the Guatemala study.
Another problem with private companies using human subjects in
developing countries is that these companies view data generated by
clinical trial as their property, an attitude supported by the FDA and
courts.268 Consequently, trials that reach publication often reflect only
positive results, communicating a skewed success rate to the public.269
Because positive studies are typically the ones published, past studies do
not inform future studies, so harmful studies may be repeated.270
prohibition in customary international law against nonconsensual human medical
experimentation cannot be enforced through the ATS”).
265. See Abdullahi v. Pfizer, Inc., 562 F.3d 163, 169 (2d Cir. N.Y. 2009) (“[T]he
incorporation of this [informed consent] norm into the laws of this country and this host of
others is a powerful indication of the international acceptance of this norm as a binding legal
obligation . . . .”).
266. Id. at 185.
267. See supra notes 262–67 and accompanying text (discussing the Second Circuit’s
recognition that the Nigerian children may have a cause of action under the ATS).
268. See Galbraith, supra note 251, at 708 (“[Private pharmaceutical] companies have
taken the position that if they are funding the research, the data produced should
consequently be deemed their property, protectable through patent, trade secret, and contract
law. Additionally, the FDA has generally supported this view, and the courts by and large
have similarly agreed.”).
269. See id. (“[O]nly a small fraction of trial outcomes are eventually published in
medical journals or in some other peer-reviewed format. Moreover, research has shown that
most of the pieces ultimately published tend to be about trials that demonstrate the treatment
under investigation was in fact superior . . . .”).
270. See id. (stating that practically, “future studies are generally not informed by
previous research”).
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Obviously, repeating harmful trials places human subjects
unnecessarily at risk.271 The FDA approval process requires human clinical
trials,272 but Americans are reluctant to participate.273 Consequently, drug
companies are incentivized to conduct trials overseas. The problem lies in
that governments of developing countries frequently choose not to regulate
clinical trials because they want their citizens to gain access to health care,
even through risky clinical participation.274 These attitudes about preferring
health care treatment, even if risky, are disturbingly similar to the
Guatemalan government’s attitude when it traded cooperation for medical
surveys and supplies.275
The lack of consistent Institutional Review Board review, a
requirement under U.S. law and present in nearly all international
standards, leads to a greater opportunity for abuses to occur because there is
no persistent check on ethical practices.276 This problem is exacerbated in
private pharmaceutical trials because such private actors are not required to
report clinical trials if they choose not to seek FDA approval.277 Private
companies, therefore, have greater opportunity to ignore ethical review.278
Though there are now extensive international guidelines, too many
overlapping and nonbinding guidelines have created an overly complicated
system. During the Guatemala study, legal forces often were not binding.279
271. See id. (“[W]hen clinical investigators replicate trials that have previously been
shown to be ineffective or even harmful, human subjects are placed at considerable risk.”).
272. See Shtilman, supra note 168, at 425 (stating the FDA approves new drugs “on the
basis of their efficacy and safety as determined by the results of time-consuming and
expensive three-phase human clinical trials”) (citations omitted).
273. See id. (“Pharmaceutical manufacturers have found Americans increasingly
hesitant to participate in drug experiments because of skepticism about their safety.”) (citing
SONIA SHAH, THE BODY HUNTERS: TESTING NEW DRUGS ON THE WORLD’S POOREST
PATIENTS 4–5 (2006)).
274. See id. (“[D]espite potential safety risks, government entities in underdeveloped
nations are often reluctant to regulate their citizens’ participation in experimental drug trials
because these trials are often perceived as the only method of obtaining otherwise
unaffordable medical treatment.”).
275. See supra note 46 and accompanying text (discussing the Guatemalan
government’s trade for the use of human subjects).
276. See supra notes 184–92 and accompanying text (discussing the role of IRBs).
277. See supra note 195 and accompanying text (discussing that a loophole in the
federal regulations is that a private company may not be regulated if it does not seek FDA
approval).
278. See supra notes 190–205 and accompanying text (explaining loopholes in the
federal regulations).
279. See supra note 65 and accompanying text (discussing that no laws were binding on
the Guatemala study's researchers in the 1940s).
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Likewise, current domestic and international regulations present similar
problems because, though regulations exist, either guidelines are not
binding or loopholes prevent adequate protection.280
Clinical studies conducted in developing nations are often the best
source of available healthcare, so perhaps the failure to seek informed
consent and IRB review is the lesser of two evils.281 It is true that
“potentially exploitative clinical research also serves a valuable purpose
because it develops life-saving and life-improving medications.”282
Nevertheless, sidestepping ethics by touting the importance of providing
health care over protections for human subjects reflects the same attitude
that the Guatemalan government displayed in a study that employed
extraordinarily invasive and painful procedures.283 The U.S. government
denounced the Guatemala study as employing practices that should never
be repeated,284 and these practices included avoidance of ethical
responsibility.285 Likewise, if the Guatemala study is truly not to be
repeated, avoidance of ethical obligations should not be tolerated today.
However, with such loose regulations governing human subject research
today, can it truly be said that a study similar to the Guatemala study cannot
recur?
IV. Learning from the Guatemala Study: Improving Informed Consent
Standards through the Research Participants Protection Modernization Act
of 2011
The United States’ current regulatory scheme as well as the inclusion
of international guidelines has created a complex system that governs
informed consent standards. Both U.S. legal standards and international
guidelines have tried to improve informed consent protections for human
280. See supra notes 190–205 and accompanying text (explaining loopholes in the
federal regulations).
281. See Farrell, supra note 226, at 136 (“Moreover, this research [by private
pharmaceutical companies] may be the best source of health care available to certain
vulnerable populations.”).
282. Id.
283. See supra notes 36–59 and accompanying text (discussing the procedures used in
the Guatemala study).
284. See Memorandum supra note 11 and accompanying text (stating President
Obama’s charge to the Presidential Commission for the Study of Bioethical Issues).
285. See supra notes 123–43 and accompanying text (analyzing how the researchers of
the Guatemala study avoided ethical responsibility).
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subjects through devices such as Institutional Review Boards.286 However,
the enforcement of laws and principles is what actually protects human
subjects, not the existence of the law or principle.
The Alien Tort Statute provides an opportunity for human subjects to
receive redress for violations of informed consent,287 but the ATS does not
prevent violations of informed consent. Realistically, human subjects who
are victims of questionable research practices often do not have the
financial resources to bring lawsuits in the United States. Pervasively, the
problem is that the main enforcer of ethical obligations—IRBs—are
overworked and “too weak and ineffective” to actually protect human
subjects.288 Without adequate oversight, the informed consent system and
other protections for human subjects is a façade for exploitation that creates
the risk of repeating the Guatemala study. Even with the ATS, more is
needed for reasonable protection. What is needed is U.S. federal legislation
with some teeth in it.
There is a piece of legislation that would fortify informed consent
standards and protect human subjects: the Research Participants Protection
Modernization Act of 2011 (RPPMA). Colorado Representative Diana
DeGette—who sponsored similar bills in 2002,289 2003,290 2006,291 and
2009292—introduced RPPMA on July 22, 2011.293 Though Congress has
not yet enacted the RPPMA into law, Congress should enact it because it
286. See Doherty, supra note 150, at 130 (“Mechanisms such as informed consent and
prospective review by IRBs have evolved to protect human subjects of clinical research.”)
(citing Alice K. Page, Ethical Issues in International Biomedical Research: An Overview,
37 J. HEALTH L. 629, 652–53 (2004)).
287. See Alien Tort Statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2011) (“The district courts shall have
original jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of
the law of nations or a treaty of the United States.”).
288. See Saver, supra note 17, at 225 (“Legitimate concerns have been raised about
IRBs’ increasing workloads, limited resources, insufficient expertise, and lack of
independence, suggesting that the IRB review system is simply too weak and ineffective to
protect subjects.”).
289. See Human Research Subject Protections Act of 2002, H.R. 4697, 107th Cong.
(2002).
290. See Protection for Participants in Research Act, H.R. 3594, 108th Cong. (2003).
291. See The Protection for Participants in Research Act of 2006, H.R. 5578, 109th
Cong. (2006).
292. See Protection for Participants in Research Act of 2009, H.R. 1715, 111th Cong.
(2009).
293. See Research Participants Protection Modernization Act of 2011, H.R. 2625, 112th
Cong. (2011) (detailing when DeGette introduced the RPPMA to the House of
Representatives).
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contains three principles that would improve the current regulatory
structure. Firstly, the RPPMA requires review of existing regulations with
the goal of harmonizing the Common Rule and FDA regulations and
extending the Common Rule to all research.294 The RPPMA also provides
financial incentives to IRBs and investigators to comply with federal
regulations. And, finally, the RPPMA grants the Department of Health and
Human Services’ Office for Human Research Protections (OHRP)
enhanced enforcement authority.295
The Research Participants Protection Modernization Act of 2011
intends “[t]o amend the Public Health Service Act with respect to human
subject research to improve protections for human subjects and, where
appropriate because of the type of research involved, to reduce regulatory
burdens.”296 To meet this goal, the RPPMA directs the Secretary of Health
and Human Services to review and harmonize the Common Rule of the
Department of Health and Human Services and FDA regulations.297 In
particular, the Secretary is instructed to determine whether thirteen matters
should be modified:
1. How to address potential financial conflicts of interest;298
2. Whether the list of exemptions from the Common Rule should
be expanded to include new categories;299
294. See id. at § 491(A)(a)(1) (“[A]ll human subject research shall be conducted in
accordance with the Common Rule, and as applicable to the human subjects involved in
such research, with the vulnerable-populations rules.”).
295. See id. at § 491(B) (discussing increased enforcement abilities of the OHRP).
296. See id.
297. See id. at § 491A(c)(2)(C)(i) (“The Secretary shall, with respect to the HHS
Human Subject Regulations, consider the matters specified in clause (iii) and make a
determination of whether any of the provisions of such Rule or any guidance associated with
such Rule should be modified accordingly.”); see also Press Release, House Representative
Diana DeGette, DeGette Introduces Research Participants Protection Act (July 22, 2011),
available at http://degette.house.gov/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id
=1096:degette-introduces-research-participants-protection-act&catid=89:health (last visited
Apr. 2, 2012) (“The Research Participants Protection Act instructs the Secretary of Health
and Human Services to review and harmonize federal policy on protecting research
participants . . . .”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social
Justice).
298. See H.R. 2625, at § 491A(c)(2)(C)(iii)(I) (“How requirements regarding the
definition and management of potential financial conflict of interest, including both
investigator and institutional conflicts of interest, should be strengthened and enforced to
protect human subjects more effectively.”).
299. See id. at § 491A(c)(2)(C)(iii)(II) (“Whether the list of exemptions from
applicability of the HHS Human Subject Regulations . . . should be expanded to include
new categories.”).
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3. “Whether and under what circumstances research that studies
human tissue or other clinical specimens should not be
considered a clinical investigation;”300
4. Whether the list of categories eligible for expedited review
under the Common Rule should be expanded;301
5. “Whether institutional review boards include sufficient
numbers of minority individuals as board members when
reviewing proposals designed to include human subjects who
are minority individuals;”302
6. Whether the number of IRB members who are nonscientific
members and unaffiliated with the institution should be
increased;303
7. “Whether institutional review boards include sufficient
numbers of individuals with appropriate scientific
expertise;”304
8. “How to enhance the protection of people with diminished
decision-making capacity;”305
9. How to reduce regulatory burdens for IRBs in multistate
research while protecting human subjects;306
10. How to modify “the requirements for managing and reporting
adverse events and unanticipated problems” both to increase
consistency between the DHHS and the FDA, and to reduce
regulatory burden;307
11. How informed consent requirements should be modified to
reduce regulatory burdens while protecting human subjects,

300. Id. at § 491A(c)(2)(C)(iii)(III).
301. See id. at § 491A(c)(2)(C)(iii)(IV) (“Whether the list of categories of research that
are eligible for expedited review under the HHS Human Subject Regulations . . . should be
expanded to include new categories of research eligible for expedited review.”).
302. Id. at § 491A(c)(2)(C)(iii)(V).
303. See Research Participants Protection Modernization Act of 2011, H.R. 2625, 112th
Cong. § 491A(c)(2)(C)(iii)(VI) (2011) (“Whether the requirements for the number of
members of an institutional review board who are individuals whose primary expertise is in
nonscientific areas, and the number of members of an institutional review board who are
individuals who are not affiliated with the institution served by the board, should be
increased.”).
304. Id. at § 491A(c)(2)(C)(iii)(VII).
305. Id. at § 491A(c)(2)(C)(iii)(VIII).
306. See id. at § 491A(c)(2)(C)(iii)(IX) (“How the requirements for institutional review
board review in multisite research should be modified to reduce regulatory burden while
protecting human subjects, including use of a lead institutional review board.”).
307. Id. at § 491A(c)(2)(C)(iii)(X).
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“including clarification of the circumstances in which
informed consent does not need to be in writing;”308
12. How research under FDA regulations should comply with the
Guidelines for Good Clinical Practice and how to further
educate investigators in compliance; and309
13. “Such additional matters as the Secretary determines to be
appropriate.”310
Inquiring into and potentially modifying these thirteen areas—
including the catchall of “such additional matters”—means informed
consent standards will receive scrutiny that is long overdue. Moreover, the
Secretary is required to publish determinations in the Federal Register,
which means that the public would have an opportunity to comment on the
findings.311 Although the DHHS’ Common Rule and FDA regulations are
substantially similar,312 inconsistencies exist, and these inconsistencies
create confusion because there are two sets of rules. The RPPMA seeks to
harmonize the two sets of regulations, which would bring about efficiency
and effectiveness in the law as well as simplify the process for researchers.
Moreover, if Congress would extend the Common Rule to research
conducted by private companies, as suggested by RPPMA, it would
strengthen the protections for human subjects and settle confusion about the
Common Rule’s applicability to private companies.
In addition to subjecting these thirteen areas to further scrutiny and
potentially modifying them, the RPPMA would further benefit informed
consent standards by amending the rules for IRBs. Investigators for
research will be required to notify IRBs of any significant financial interest
and whether the research has been submitted to another IRB and that IRB’s
findings.313 Significantly, investigators will also be required to disclose
308. See Research Participants Protection Modernization Act of 2011, H.R. 2625, 112th
Cong. § 491A(c)(2)(C)(iii)(XI) (2011) (“How the requirements for approval and oversight of
human subjects research that poses no more than minimal risk to participants . . . should be
modified to reduce regulatory burden . . . while protecting research participants, including
clarification of the circumstances in which informed consent does not need to be writing.”).
309. See id. at § 491A(c)(2)(C)(iii)(XII) (“Whether research . . . should comply with
the guideline published by the Food and Drug Administration . . . entitled ‘Good Clinical
Practice: Consolidated Guideline,’ and how investigators can be educated effectively
regarding compliance with this guideline.”).
310. Id. at § 491A(c)(2)(C)(iii)(XIII).
311. See id. at § 491A(c)(2)(C)(ii) (“The Secretary shall publish the determination
required by clause (i) in the Federal Register.”).
312. See supra note 179 and accompanying text (stating that the Common Rule and the
FDA regulations are “virtually identical”).
313. See Research Participants Protection Modernization Act of 2011, H.R. 2625, 112th
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whether they have been “disqualified or restricted by any Federal, State, or
local entity in their ability to conduct human subject research.”314 These
disclosures must be submitted when the research is proposed, or as soon as
the circumstances arise.315 In addition to encouraging transparency,
requiring these disclosures would aid in eliminating the concern that
harmful studies are repeated merely because the product is not pursued for
FDA marketing, thereby solving another current problem with human
subject research.316
As for financial incentives, the RPPMA encourages compliance by
allowing institutions to recover costs from complying with human subject
protections as direct costs from government sponsors of the research.317
The RPPMA also addresses the issue of educating IRBs and investigators
by restricting the Secretary of Health and Human Services from awarding a
grant, cooperative agreement, or contract for human subject research
“unless the public entity or private academic institution . . . maintains or
contracts for a program to educate investigators and board members on the
protection of human subjects in research.”318 Removing funding for studies
that do not educate the researchers or IRBs provides a practical reason for
researchers to focus more on informed consent procedures as well as a
method to reeducate parties involved in human subject research about the
importance and goals of informed consent procedures.
Finally, the RPPMA provides the Office for Human Research
Protections with more enforcement abilities. The Director of OHRP would
have authority to establish criteria for assuring compliance with human
subject protections; would direct activities at the federal level to protect
human subjects; would “carry out educational and quality improvement
programs for human subject protections for principal investigators,
Cong § 491(A)(d)(1)(A)(i),(iii) (2011) (describing the requirements for an investigator
submitting research to an IRB).
314. Id. at § 491(A)(d)(1)(A)(ii).
315. See id. at § 491(A)(d)(1)(B) (“A notification required by subparagraph (A) shall be
submitted to the institution served by the board—(i) at the time of submitting the proposal
for human subject research to the board; or (ii) in the case of circumstances arising after such
submission, immediately.”).
316. See supra notes 269–81 and accompanying text (discussing the problems of
harmful studies repeating).
317. See H.R. 2625, at § 491(A)(d)(3) (“Institutions may recover costs associated with
compliance for human subject protections under this part from government sponsors of
research as direct costs.”).
318. Research Participants Protection Modernization Act of 2011, H.R. 2625, 112th
Cong. § 491(A)(e) (2011).
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members of institutional review boards, and other appropriate persons;”
would advise entities about how to comply with human subject protections;
would make grants for recruiting and training minority individuals to serve
on IRBs; and would “consult with experts in biomedical, behavioral, and
social sciences research.”319 Currently, the Office for Human Research
Protections calls for the Division of Compliance Oversight (DCO) to
evaluate noncompliance with DHHS regulations and then the OHRP
decides what, if any, regulatory action is needed.320 By enacting the
RPPMA, the FDA and DHHS would continue to include IRBs within their
regulatory structures, but would be able to increase oversight and
accountability through the OHRP, because the OHRP would have more
robust authority to ensure continual compliance with U.S. regulations.
Interestingly, the same day that the Representative DeGette proposed
the Research Participants Protection Modernization Act of 2011, the DHHS
and the FDA issued an announcement of proposed rulemaking that would
address several of the issues recommended in RPPMA.321 The DHHS’
proposal to improve protections for human subjects focuses on seven areas,
many of which mirror the RPPMA’s goals. The proposed improvements
are as follows:
1. Revising the existing risk-based framework to more accurately
calibrate the level of review to the level of risk.
2. Using a single Institutional Review Board review for all
domestic sites of multi-site studies.
3. Updating the forms and processes used for informed consent.
4. Establishing mandatory data security and information
protection standards for all studies involving identifiable or
potentially identifiable data.

319. Id. at § 491(B)(b) (describing the duties of the Director).
320. See Office for Human Research Protection, Compliance Oversight,
http://www.hhs.gov/ohrp/compliance/ (last visited Apr. 2, 2012) (“OHRP asks the institution
involved to investigate the allegations and to provide OHRP with a written report of its
investigation. The Office then determines what, if any, regulatory action needs to be taken
to protect human research subjects.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Journal of Civil
Rights and Social Justice).
321. See Press Release, Department of Health and Human Services Press Office, HHS
Announces Proposal to Improve Rules Protecting Human Research Subjects, (Jul. 22,
2011), http://www.hhs.gov/news/press/2011pres/07/20110722a.html (last visited Apr. 2,
2012) (announcing a proposal to improve rules aimed at enhancing oversight and protecting
human research subjects) (on file with the Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and
Social Justice).
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5. Implementing a systematic approach to the collection and
analysis of data on unanticipated problems and adverse events
across all trials to harmonize the complicated array of
definitions and reporting requirements, and to make the
collection of data more efficient.
6. Extending federal regulatory protections to apply to all
research conducted at U.S. institutions receiving funding from
the Common Rule agencies.
7. Providing uniform guidance on federal regulations.322

The goal of the new proposal is to better uphold the ethical principles
behind the Common Rule, and public comment is being sought until
October 26, 2011.323 Though the proposed rule is a step in the right
direction, the rule addresses the 2001 findings of the Presidential
Commission for Bioethical Issues and is not as comprehensive as the
Research Participants Protection Modernization Act of 2011. As a result,
the RPPMA is still needed to fully address the problems with the U.S.
informed consent system.
Rather than relying on the DHHS’ proposed rule alone, Congress
should adopt the Research Participants Protection Modernization Act of
2011. Unlike the bills that Representative DeGette proposed in the past,
news of the Guatemala study has created more public pressure to change
modern informed consent laws. The financial incentives for IBRs as well
as the goal to streamline federal regulations make the RPPMA an effective
remedy to problems found in federal informed consent regulations because
parties involved would better understand how the regulations work and
have an incentive to follow the regulations. Moreover, the Office for
Human Subject Protections’ enhanced enforcement authority would
centralize federal authority and provide clarity to researchers, many of
which truly want to comply with informed consent procedures (unlike the
researchers in the Guatemala study).
The mandatory reporting
requirements the RPPMA offers in combination with the enhanced
enforcement authority granted to the Office for Human Subject Protections
also creates a more transparent system and allows the IRB system to
become a more effective enforcement mechanism.
322. See id.
323. See Human Subjects Research Protections: Changing Protections for Research
Subjects and Reducing Burden, Delay, and Ambiguity for Investigators, 76 Fed. Reg. 143
(proposed Jul. 22, 2011) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. Parts 50 and 56) (seeking to establish
better methods to uphold ethical principles in medical research).
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V. Conclusion
Despite the protections that federal regulations and international
guidelines impart, improvements are needed. The goals of current federal
protections and modern international guidelines should be extended in the
law to cover all situations involving research with human subjects. It is
feasible to do this through adopting the Research Participants Protection
Modernization Act of 2011 that extends the Common Rule, provides for
greater enforcement of current protections, and reshapes the IRB oversight
system into an effective enforcement mechanism.
The Guatemala study was horrendous, and the legal standards and
guidelines of its day failed to protect Guatemalans who were infected with
syphilis. Similar studies are being conducted by U.S. researchers in
developing nations around the world, whether through grants from the U.S.
government or by private U.S. companies. These problems must be
remedied, and the Research Participants Protection Modernization Act of
2011 provides the impetus for the U.S. to do so. As Amy Gutmann, Chair
of the Presidential Commission for the Study of Bioethical Issues stated, “a
civilization can be judged by the way that it treats its most vulnerable
individuals. There is no position of vulnerability that is greater than to be
the subject of a medical experiment.”324

324.

Gutmann, supra note 12.

